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 The most transformative period of American history, the antebellum era, saw the rise 
and fall of numerous political parties, countless debates about the nature of the union, and the 
descent of the nation into Civil War. This thesis focuses on George Edmund Badger, a 
staunchly constructionist Whig Senator from New Bern, North Carolina – the final state to 
secede from the Union – who served from 1846 to 1855. Focusing on Badger allows this 
work to be both a biography and an examination of how Whig politics influenced the level of 
Unionism in North Carolina. Through the use of speeches delivered by Badger during his 
time in the Senate and newspaper articles published in North Carolina, this study delves into 
what Badger and his constituents in the Tar Heel state thought about the key pieces of 
legislation from the antebellum era. It also highlights the secession crisis in North Carolina, 
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 On May 20, 1861, North Carolina became the eleventh and final state to secede from 
the union. Despite being the last to secede, North Carolina had a larger ratio of slaves to 
whites than four of its Confederate brethren and a higher ratio of slaveowners to non-
slaveowners than three of the other Confederate states.1 With its high slave population and 
ownership, one might think the decision to secede an easy one for the Old North State, but 
this was not the case. An active state-level Whig Party contributed greatly to North 
Carolina’s prolonged support of the Union. However, one of the most prominent and 
influential Whigs in antebellum North Carolina politics, George Edmund Badger, has, 
according to one historian, “almost been forgotten by the people of North Carolina,” and the 
nation.2 
Badger’s political career mirrored that of North Carolina’s Whig Party, from its rise 
to state dominance in the late 1830s to its continued existence following the death of the 
national Whig Party in 1852. An outspoken defender of the Constitution, Badger favored a 
strict constructionist interpretation, adhering to what he believed was its explicit intentions 
even when it went against his personal beliefs and interests. A competitive state-level Whig 
Party with a strong sense of unionism helped hold the Old North State in the Union until the 
very end. Badger’s role as a leader and elder statesman of the North Carolina Whig Party 
cannot be overlooked when discussing antebellum politics in the state or the United States.  
 
1 For every white person that lived in North Carolina in 1860, there were .53 enslaved people, and for 
every non-slave owning household there were .28 slaveholding ones. Hudson Meadwell and Lawrence M. 
Anderson, “Sequence and Strategy in the Secession of the American South, Theory and Society 37, no. 3 
(2008), 208. 
2 Lawrence Foushee London, “George Edmund Badger in the United States Senate, 1846-1849,” North 
Carolina Historical Review 15, no. 1 (1938), 1. 
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 As a senator from 1846-1855, Badger contributed to the debates surrounding several 
key pieces of legislation, including the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the Compromise of 
1850, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Despite Badger’s importance, no dedicated work has 
been published about him, and he only receives passing mention by the most extensive 
studies of the antebellum era and politics, namely Michael Holt’s The Rise and Fall of the 
American Whig Party, William Freehling’s two-volume work The Road to Disunion, and 
David Potter’s The Impending Crisis.3 The person who wrote the most on Badger, historian 
Lawrence Foushee London, did so in three articles published in the North Carolina 
Historical Review in 1938. These articles focused solely on Badger’s time as a senator, with 
very little additional information included, and were far from extensive.4 In his 1966 article, 
“For the Want of a Scribe,” historian Glenn Tucker lamented that historians overlooked 
Badger’s contributions to antebellum politics: “ten biographies have been written of Charles 
Sumner and nine of Thaddeus Stevens, while George E. Badger, an abler, more balanced, 
and certainly more attractive personality in many respects that either…has had none.”5 
Tucker’s panegyric failed to rally any historian to write a biography of Badger.  
 Numerous scholarly works provide an in-depth analysis of the many important 
developments that occurred during the antebellum era, allowing for a fuller understanding of 
the world that Badger inhabited. A tremendous guide to the antebellum era, Daniel Walker 
 
3 Michael Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the 
Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); David Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1976); William Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Vol. 1: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991); William Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Vol. 2: Secessionists Triumphant, 
1854-1862 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
4 London, “George Edmund Badger in the United States Senate, 1846-1849;” Lawrence Foushee 
London, “George Edmund Badger and the Compromise of 1850,” North Carolina Historical Review 15, no. 2 
(1938); Lawrence Foushee London, “George Edmund Badger, His Last Years in the United States Senate, 1851-
1855,” North Carolina Historical Review 15, no. 3 (1938). 
5 Glenn Tucker, “For the Want of a Scribe,” North Carolina Historical Review 43, no. 2 (1966), 175-6. 
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Howe’s What Hath God Wrought (2007), details every major event that shaped America 
from 1815 to 1848. The sequel to Howe’s book in the Oxford History of the United States 
series, James McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom (1988), picks up where Howe left off and 
discusses how America became a house divided, as well as the terrible Civil War that came 
from that division. A brief but brilliant overview of America’s descent into disunion, Michael 
Holt’s The Fate of Their Country (2004) is an informative look at politics in the antebellum 
era.6  
 Several key works stand out about antebellum North Carolina politics. James 
Boykin’s North Carolina in 1861 (1961) discusses the causes and outcome of the secession 
movement in North Carolina and provides a good overview of why the leaders of the Old 
North State eventually favored secession. Perhaps still the two most important works on 
antebellum North Carolina politics, Marc Kruman’s Parties and Politics in North Carolina 
(1983) and Thomas Jeffrey’s State Parties and National Politics (1989), offer differing views 
on what influenced the Tarheel state’s politics the most. Jeffrey argues that state and local 
governments impacted the lives of antebellum Americans more than did the national 
government, and therefore the issues important to those governments were more important to 
antebellum Americans than the issues plaguing the federal government. Kruman, on the other 
hand, focuses more on how national debates influenced those in North Carolina, though he 
also includes a fair amount of information on local and state issues. Lastly, Daniel Crofts 
 
6 Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007); James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988); Michael Holt, The Fate of Their Country: Politicians, Slavery Extension, and the 
Coming of the Civil War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004). 
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details, in Reluctant Confederates (1989), the unionist struggle and ultimate failure to keep 
the Upper South from seceding.7  
 Additionally, there are several articles that help expand one’s knowledge of the many 
events that occurred during the antebellum era in North Carolina. Max Williams’ “The 
Foundations of the Whig Party in North Carolina” gives a brief introduction to how the Whig 
Party gained dominance in the state. Brian Walton’s “Elections to the United States Senate in 
North Carolina, 1835-1861” is an excellent guide for examining why certain senatorial 
candidates either succeeded or failed in the Tarheel state. Thomas Jeffrey’s articles, 
“National Issues, Local Interests, and the Transformation of Antebellum North Carolina 
Politics” and “‘Thunder from the Mountains’: Thomas Lanier Clingman and the end of Whig 
Supremacy in North Carolina,” cover how the Whigs gained, and then subsequently lost, 
their position of dominance in the Old North State.8  
 In that same vein, James Morrill’s “The Presidential Election of 1852,” discusses how 
the Election of 1852 proved to be the end of the national Whig Party. Stephen Berry and 
James Hill Weldon III’s “The Cane of His Existence” does a marvelous job of using the 
“Brooks-Sumner Affair”—in which South Carolina representative Preston Brooks beat 
Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner with a cane in 1856 in response to a perceived 
 
7 James H. Boykin, North Carolina in 1861 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1961); Marc W. Kruman, 
Parties and Politics in North Carolina, 1836-1865 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1983); 
Thomas E. Jeffrey, State Parties and National Politics: North Carolina, 1815-1861 (Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 1989); Daniel Crofts, Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). 
8 Max R. Williams, “The Foundations of the Whig Party in North Carolina: A Synthesis and a Modest 
Proposal,” North Carolina Historical Review 47, no. 2 (1970), 115-129; Brian G. Walton, “Elections to the 
United States Senate in North Carolina, 1835-1861,” North Carolina Historical Review 53, no. 2 (1976), 168-
192; Thomas E. Jeffrey, “National Issues, Local Interests, and the Transformation of Antebellum North Carolina 
Politics,” Journal of Southern History 50, no. 1 (1984), 43-74; Thomas E. Jeffrey, “’Thunder from the 
Mountains’: Thomas Lanier Clingman and the End of Whig Supremacy in North Carolina,” North Carolina 
Historical Review 56, no. 4 (1979), 366-395. 
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insult—to illustrate the level of animosity in pre-Civil War America. In “William Henry 
Seward and the Onset of the Secession Crisis,” Michael Robinson examines how some 
northerners, like Secretary of State Seward, tried to keep the South from seceding through 
appeasement. Lastly, Hudson Meadwell and Lawrence M. Anderson’s “Sequence and 
Strategy in the Secession of the American South” lays out the reasoning behind secession 
while also providing useful statistical data.9 
 This thesis places Badger’s life in the context of these major political events along the 
road to the Civil War and examines the role he played in trying to avert that catastrophe. In 
chapter one, I discuss the legal career of Badger and his rise in politics. In this chapter, I use 
both Badger’s shift from the Democratic Party to the Whigs and his accession to the position 
of Secretary of the Navy in the cabinet of William Henry Harrison as a way to examine the 
Whig Party’s rise to dominance in North Carolina. In chapter two, I delve into Badger’s time 
as a senator, focusing on his role during the debates surrounding the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo and the Compromise of 1850. Examining Badger’s key speeches in Congress and 
coverage in local newspapers, allows us to understand what North Carolinians thought about 
these pieces of legislation and how these bills affected the United States. In chapter three, I 
cover Badger’s time as a senator during the aftermath of the Compromise of 1850 and the 
debate surrounding the enormously influential Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. I also examine 
why Badger lost his Senate seat, how that mirrored the fall of the Whig Party in North 
Carolina and nationally, and the coming of the secession crisis. Lastly, in the epilogue, I 
 
9 James R. Morrill, “The Presidential Election of 1852: Death Knell of the Whig Party of North 
Carolina,” North Carolina Historical Review 44, no. 4 (1967), 342-359; Stephen Berry and James Hill Welborn 
III, “The Cane of His Existence: Depression, Damage, and the Brooks-Sumner Affair,” Southern Cultures (2014), 
1-21; Michael Robinson, “William Henry Steward and the Onset of the Secession Crisis,” Civil War History 59, 
no. 1 (2013), 32-66; Hudson Meadwell and Lawrence M. Anderson, “Sequence and Strategy in the Secession of 
the American South,” Theory and Society 37, no. 3 (2008), 199-227. 
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discuss the secession movement in North Carolina and Badger’s role in it. I argue that Whig 
politics and a healthy two-party system allowed North Carolina to stay in the Union for as 
long as it did, though the Old North State, like Badger, eventually succumbed to secession. 
 At the time of his death in 1866, Badger was a highly respected and outspoken 
statesman in North Carolina, whose career rose and fell with that of the Tarheel state’s Whig 
Party. Yet few North Carolinians remember him today. With his rigid constitutionalism and 
spirit of compromise, Badger attempted to put what he felt was good for the nation over his 
own personal or sectional interests. Examining Badger’s career can help us better understand 
the Whig Party’s rise to dominance in North Carolina, and its pivotal role in the secession 
crisis. 10 This thesis is important for two reasons. Firstly, because studying Badger’s career 
allows us to see that not all politicians in the antebellum era were driven by greed and 
personal interests. Secondly, Badger is an example of compromise and reason and is 











10 London, “Badger in the United States Senate,” 1. 
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Chapter One: Conception, 1795-1841 
 Upon reaching the age of adulthood, which in 1816 was twenty-one, George Edmund 
Badger of New Bern, North Carolina, did not have many options when it came time to 
choose a political party. The first party system was on its last leg that year, as the Federalist 
Party came to a crushing end at the hands of the Democratic-Republican presidential 
candidate James Monroe. Monroe’s presidency kicked off the “Era of Good Feelings,” and 
when it came time for him to stand for re-election in 1820, Monroe faced no opposition. 
Monroe’s un-opposed rule came to an end following his second term, after he chose to heed 
precedent and step down. This caused a power vacuum to open within the Democratic-
Republican Party, allowing four members of that party to run for President in 1824. This 
infighting to determine the party’s future destroyed the Democratic-Republican Party. 
 The competition surrounding who would replace Monroe as the head of the only 
party in Washington gave Badger, as well as the rest of the nation, a choice between four 
candidates: John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, William 
H. Crawford of Georgia, and Henry Clay of Kentucky. Like most North Carolina voters, 
Badger favored Andrew Jackson, the war hero who had recently won the Battle of New 
Orleans during the War of 1812. Badger’s support of Jackson only intensified after the House 
of Representatives gave the Presidency to Adams following what became known as “The 
Corrupt Bargain”--a supposed deal struck between the Speaker of the House Henry Clay and 
John Quincy Adams to have the House give Adams the Presidency in exchange for Clay 
being named his Secretary of State.11 
 
11 Lawrence Foushee London, “George Edmund Badger in the United States Senate, 1846-1849,” 
North Carolina Historical Review 15, no. 1 (1938), 1-3; The desire to have more than one Presidential nominee 
to choose from was obvious, since the voter turnout in 1824 almost tripled what it had been in 1820. 
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 In 1828, when Jackson ran for President again, this time solely against Adams, 
Badger played a large role in him getting elected. According to biographer Lawrence 
Foushee London, Badger wrote “the two most important addresses issued by the executive 
committee of [Jackson’s] party.”12 The committee for Jackson’s election from Wake County, 
which Badger chaired, stated: “We believe Andrew Jackson to be a man of the utmost 
honesty and singleness of purpose, gifted by nature with an excellent understanding…these 
qualities make him [able to] properly and honorably discharge…every duty.”13 North 
Carolina Democrats recommended Badger be appointed Attorney General for his efforts, but 
Jackson snubbed him. This rejection, along with Badger’s disagreement with Jackson over 
the virtues of internal improvements and the Second Bank of the United States, caused 
Badger to become a member of the newly formed Whig Party. Badger’s defection cost the 
North Carolina Democratic Party dearly. As London asserted, “once [Badger joined] the 
Whig Party, he became one of its staunchest members.”14 
*** 
Born on April 17, 1795, in New Bern, North Carolina, to Thomas Badger and Lydia 
Cogdell Badger, George Edmund Badger came from a heritage of American patriots and 
pioneers. Badger’s maternal grandfather, Richard Cogdell, served as a colonel during the 
Revolutionary War, and Badger’s paternal ancestors arrived in New England soon after the 
pilgrims landed.15 Badger spent his formative years in New Bern, and though his family was 
well to do, tragedy found him as a child when his father died suddenly at the age of thirty-
 
12 London, “Badger in the United States Senate,” 2. 
13 New Bern Sentinel, January 12, 1828. 
14 London, “Badger in the United States Senate,” 3. 
15 London, “Badger in the United States Senate,” 1-2; Genealogical data on Badger’s family, including 




three on October 15, 1799.16 Badger’s life may have turned out much differently had his 
mother not been independently wealthy before her marriage, already experienced with being 
in charge of a household, and strong-willed. This experience came from her time managing 
her five slaves and taking care of her little sister following the death of her father in 1787.17 
Badger grew up in New Bern, completing his provisional schooling and playing with 
his siblings all under the watchful gaze of his mother.18 Badger’s first excursion from home 
came in 1810 when he started training to become a lawyer at Yale. He had to return to New 
Bern two years later due to a lack of funds but was able to continue studying law under his 
maternal cousin John Stanley. Badger’s determination to complete his legal training paid off, 
when in 1815 the Supreme Court of North Carolina awarded him a license to practice law in 
the state, despite Badger being underage. The Court decided that Badger should be allowed 
to practice law while he was not legally an adult because his mother and sisters were reliant 
on him financially. Badger’s initial practice as a private attorney was short-lived after he was 
elected to the North Carolina House of Commons in 1816.19 
Badger openly campaigned for election.20 Badger wrote in a letter “to the freeholders 
and freemen of the town of New Bern,” published in the Carolina Federal Republican, a 
newspaper from New Bern: “with no other claim on your attention than a sincere desire to be 
useful, I offer myself for your consideration as one who is willing to represent you in the next 
General Assembly.” In an attempt to further entice his constituents, Badger added, “should 
 
16 Grave Index of Thomas Badger found on Ancestry.com; I searched for an obituary for Thomas 
Badger, but one does not seem to exist. 
17 US Census Data for 1790, ancestry.com; Grave Index for Richard Cogdell, ancestry.com. 
18 London, “Badger in the United States Senate,” 1-2; According to records found on ancestry.com it 
seems like Badger had two younger sisters, one named Elizabeth and one named Lucretia. 
19 London, “Badger in the United States Senate,” 1-2. 
20 Raleigh Register quoted in, London, “Badger in the United States Senate,” 4. 
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you think that your interests can be safely entrusted to my care, I shall endeavor by every 
service…to evince how highly I value your confidence and how anxious I am to deserve 
it.”21 Badger proved successful in his election and was a member of the General Assembly 
for two years until Thomas Ruffin asked Badger in 1818 to take over his law practice while 
Ruffin served as a General Assembly judge.22 
*** 
The political climate that Badger entered was one in constant flux. America’s First 
Party System emerged in the years following the ratification of the United States Constitution 
in 1788. The two parties, Federalists led by Alexander Hamilton and the Democratic-
Republicans led by Thomas Jefferson, disagreed over the size of the federal government, and 
how involved it should be; Federalists wanted a larger, more powerful central government 
and Democratic-Republicans preferred a smaller one that delegated more powers to the 
states. Unsurprisingly, given North Carolina’s propensity for a smaller government and fewer 
taxes, the state largely favored the Democratic-Republican Party, even voting for Thomas 
Jefferson during his unsuccessful bid for president in 1796.23 
By the time Badger entered the political arena in 1816, the Federalist Party had 
ceased to exist. John Adams’ uninspiring presidency and his ugly falling out with Alexander 
Hamilton contributed greatly to the party’s downfall. Perceived anti-patriotic actions 
following Federalist criticism of the War of 1812 assured the party’s death. After the demise 
 
21 Carolina Federal Republican (New Bern, North Carolina), August 3, 1816. 
22 London, “Badger in the United States Senate,” 1-2; During this time, Badger also began serving as a 
trustee of the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. A position that he held from 1818 to 1844; Lawrence 
London, “Badger, George Edmund,” http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.p1?index=b000022, 
accessed August 13, 2020. 
23 William S. Powell, North Carolina: A History (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1977) 90-1, 98-9. 
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of the Federalist Party, the Democratic-Republicans were the only players in town, but after 
James Monroe’s two consecutive un-contested runs for President, the Democratic-
Republicans fractured as well, bringing about the rise of two new political parties—the 
Democrats and the Whigs. Several other parties came and went during the antebellum era, 
mirroring the massive changes that occurred in the United States during that time, and 
Badger had a hand in several of the key events of that period.24 
*** 
Badger took over Ruffin’s practice until 1820 when he was elected as a judge on the 
North Carolina Superior Court, a position that he held for five years until he resigned to take 
a more lucrative job as a practicing lawyer in Raleigh.25 Badger’s election to the Superior 
Court did not go smoothly, as he won by a majority of one vote on the ninth ballot.26 Once in 
office, Badger rode his circuit and heard cases, none of which were out of the ordinary. The 
most notable case that Badger presided over during his time as a Superior Court judge was 
that of two African American men - Peter and Fred - who were charged with stealing bacon 
and lard from the storehouse of a Mr. James Coffield. According to a report in the Weekly 
Raleigh Register, the two men “were convicted and sentenced to be executed,” punishment 
that far exceeded the crime but one that was far too often the case in the antebellum South.27  
During Badger’s time as a member of the House of Commons and a Superior Court 
judge, the national debate over slavery began in earnest. Historian Michael Holt argues in 
The Fate of Their County, “the slavery extension issue first emerged because of decisions by 
 
24 Powell, North Carolina, 90-1, 98-9. 
25 London, “Badger in the United States Senate,” 1-2. 
26 Weekly Raleigh Register, December 15, 1820. 
27 Weekly Raleigh Register, April 30, 1824; This level of punishment may reflect Badger’s own views 
on how slaves should be punished, giving one insight into how Badger’s own slaves could have been treated. 
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elected officeholders…not because of a groundswell of public pressure…that point is 
crucial.”28 The first substantial moment when the issue of slavery extension found its way 
upon the floor of Congress was in 1819 with the debate surrounding the admission of 
Missouri as a slave state. Northerners, already upset by the over-representation of southerners 
in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College (thanks to the Constitution’s three-
fifths compromise), were concerned about the two additional Senate seats the admittance of 
Missouri would give the South. White southerners, on the other hand, firmly believed that if 
Congress forced Missouri to free its slaves as the cost of statehood, then Congress could 
abolish slavery in every new state that entered the Union.29 
To settle the debate over slavery’s expansion, Congress passed the Missouri 
Compromise in 1820, against the objections of many northerners. The legislation admitted 
Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a free state to keep the number of Senate seats even 
between North and South. The compromise also “forever prohibited slavery in the 
unorganized area of the Louisiana Purchase territory north of the parallel thirty-six degrees 
thirty minutes.”30 Though most northern members of Congress opposed the Missouri 
Compromise, the vast majority of southern congressmen supported it, allowing the bill to 
pass. At least one notable public figure from the South at that time, Thomas Jefferson, did 
not share his neighbors’ enthusiasm. Jefferson wrote, “this momentous question [slavery 
expansion], like a fire bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at 
 
28 Michael Holt, The Fate of Their Country: Politicians, Slavery Extension, and the Coming of the Civil 
War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 4. 
29 Holt, Fate of Their Country, 5-6; Northerners felt that southerners were over-represented because 
of the three-fifths compromise in the Constitution which counted each slave as three-fifths of a person when 
it came time to determine a state’s population, despite the fact that slaves were not considered citizens, and 
often not even considered people.  
30 Holt, Fate of Their Country, 6. 
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once as the death knell of the Union. It is hushed indeed for the moment, but this is a reprieve 
only, not a final sentence.”31 
Because the Democratic-Republicans were the only political party in Washington 
during 1820, the debate surrounding the Missouri Compromise devolved strictly along 
sectional lines.32 North Carolinians, like most of their southern brethren, no doubt initially 
supported the Missouri Compromise when it passed in 1820. Southerners viewed the 
compromise as a positive thing that opened a wide swath of the country to slavery without 
further debate. As the decades passed, however, southern sentiment regarding the 
compromise began to sour; more and more people saw it as less of a positive tool for 
slavery’s expansion and more of a negative restriction on the institution’s future. Badger 
echoed this southern lament several times during his many speeches on the Senate floor.33  
Perhaps all the turmoil and vitriol surrounding the passage of the Missouri 
Compromise helped Badger initially to choose to forego life as a public figure and return to 
his private law practice. Regardless of what Badger’s deciding factor was, his decision to 
leave politics proved quite prosperous for him, not only monetarily, but also reputationally. 
Badger argued one-third of all the cases heard before the North Carolina Supreme Court from 
1825 to 1846. He also argued forty-four cases before the Supreme Court of the United 
 
31 Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes, April 22, 1820, 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/159.html, accessed August 18, 2020. 
32 Holt, Fate of Their Country, 7. 
33 Holt, Fate of Their Country, 6; George Edmund Badger, “Speech of Mr. Badger, of North Carolina, 
on the Territorial Question, and Against Secession, Disunion, and Forcible Resistance on Account of the 
Wilmot Proviso – and for the Union and the Constitution, and for Constitutional Remedies in the Union,” in 
the Senate of the United States, August 2, 1850; George Edmund Badger, “Speech of the Honorable George E. 
Badger, of North Carolina, on the Nebraska Bill,” in the United States Senate, February 16, 1854; George 




States.34 Badger’s legal skills were in high demand throughout his career as a lawyer. He 
even argued many cases before the Supreme Court of the United States while he was serving 
as a U.S. Senator in the 1840s and 1850s.35 These cases undoubtedly helped Badger hone the 
oratory and argumentative skills that he would put to good use on the floor of the Senate. 
 Despite focusing on his legal practice, Badger still maintained an interest in politics. 
While Badger made a name for himself as a lawyer, the Whig Party gained dominance in the 
state of North Carolina. The foundations of the Whig Party were laid during the presidential 
election of 1824, twelve years before the Whig Party appeared on the national stage. During 
that election, North Carolina’s vote split between Andrew Jackson, the hero of the Battle of 
New Orleans during the War of 1812, and William Harris Crawford, the Treasury Secretary 
of the United States. Jackson won the state of North Carolina by eight percent of the vote, 
garnering a lot of support in the western and coastal counties, compared to Crawford who 
was popular amongst plantation owners, rice farmers, and Quakers.36  
To the dismay of North Carolinians, neither candidate won the presidency. Since 
none of the four candidates – Andrew Jackson, William Crawford, John Quincy Adams, and 
Henry Clay – received the required 131 electoral votes to be elected President, the House of 
Representatives chose who would win the election. Since the House considered only the top 
 
34 Thomas Rodgers Hunter, “George Edmund Badger 1795-1866: A North Carolinians Life in Politics 
and Law,” Master’s Thesis, (University of Virginia, 1986), 362, 366-8; United States v. Daniel et al., 47 US 11 
(1848), loc.gov, accessed August 15, 2020; Gilmer v. Poindexter, 51 US 257 (1850), loc.gov, accessed August 
15, 2020; Montault et al. v. United States, 53 US 47 (1851), loc.gov, accessed August 15, 2020; United States v. 
Fossat, 61 US 413 (1857), loc.gov, accessed August 15, 2020. 
35 Badger argued twenty-seven of the forty-four of his cases before the Supreme Court while he was 
serving as a Senator and argued the remaining seventeen after he retired. Though it appears that he argued 
only a couple of cases before the North Carolina Supreme Court the year he became a Senator, and then never 
argued a case before that court again. That may be due to some type of conflict of interest, or perhaps he felt 
like North Carolina Supreme Court cases were no longer worth his time once he became a Senator. Hunter, 
“George Edmund Badger,” 362, 366-8. 
36 Max R. Williams, “The Foundations of the Whig Party in North Carolina: A Synthesis and a Modest 
Proposal,” The North Carolina Historical Review 47, no. 2 (1970), 116. 
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three vote earners, Henry Clay departed the contest. Though, serendipitously for him, he was 
the Speaker of the House, a position that allowed him to have a sizeable amount of influence 
and power over who the House selected as president.37  
When the dust settled, the House of Representatives selected John Quincy Adams as 
the sixth President of the United States. Rumors quickly spread amongst Jackson supporters 
that a “corrupt bargain” had been struck between Adams and Clay to steal the election away 
from Jackson. To many, these rumors appeared to become truths when Adams named Clay 
his Secretary of State. Commenting on the election of Adams, the Raleigh Register stated, 
“for some time past, the friends of Mr. Clay have hinted that they, like the Swiss, would fight 
for those who pay best.” When Adams offered Clay the position of Secretary of State if Clay 
helped him win the election in the House, “friends of Clay gave this information to the 
friends of Jackson, and hinted that if the friends of Jackson would offer the same price they 
would close for them. But none of the friends of Jackson would descend to such mean barter 
and sale.”38 
John Quincy Adams’ lackluster presidency, along with Jackson’s exponentially 
growing support throughout the country, ushered Jackson into the White House by a 
landslide in 1828. Jackson’s victory was particularly overwhelming in North Carolina, with 
Adams carrying only nine of the state’s sixty-four counties. However, it was Jackson’s bid 
for re-election in 1832 that proved him unstoppable. Running against Henry Clay, who at that 
time was a National Republican, Jackson won sixty-three of North Carolina’s sixty-four 
counties, and eighty-five percent of the state’s popular vote. When the votes came in from 
the country at large, Jackson won 219 electoral votes to Clay’s 49, outperforming his 
 
37 Williams, “Foundations of the Whig Party,” 116-7. 
38 Raleigh Register, February 8, 1825. 
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impressive 1828 numbers. Jackson’s actions as president led to the founding of the Whig 
Party, whose sole initial purpose was to oppose all things Jacksonian.39 
Three key events pushed some of Jackson supporters away from him, and out of the 
Democratic Party forever: the Nullification Crisis of 1832, the Compromise Tariff of 1833, 
and Jackson’s war against the Second Bank of the United States.40 The Nullification Crisis 
began when South Carolinians, under the guidance of Jackson’s former vice president, John 
C. Calhoun, argued that a state could nullify a federal tariff if they thought it oppressive. 
South Carolinians found the “Tariff of Abominations” tyrannical. Passed in 1828, the “Tariff 
of Abominations” goal was to protect the manufacturing industry in the northern states by 
placing a tariff of up to forty-five percent on imported goods from Europe. This incensed 
southerners who had come to enjoy being able to consume imported manufactured goods 
without needing to be wealthy.41 
Calhoun emerged as the leader of the opposition to the “Tariff of Abominations” 
mostly due to his stance as a leader in South Carolina politics. South Carolina had yet to 
recover from the economic Panic of 1819, and cotton farmers there blamed the tariff of 1828 
for taking forty percent of their profits.42 Many people in South Carolina had become tired of 
the tariff’s negative impact on their economy, with several proposing secession. Calhoun’s 
goal was to argue that the tariff should be done away with while also arguing that South 
 
39 Williams, “Foundations of the Whig Party,” 117-8. 
40 Thomas Jeffrey, “National Issues, Local Interests, and the Transformation of Antebellum North 
Carolina Politics,” Journal of Southern History 50, no. 1 (1984), 45; Williams, “Foundations of the Whig Party,” 
117-8. 
41 Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 395; John McCardell, The Idea of a Southern Nation: Southern Nationalists 
and Southern Nationalism (New York: Norton, 1979). 
42 Modern economists have noted that this number was more likely closer to twenty percent, but at 
the time the forty percent argument garnered a lot of support from struggling South Carolinians; Howe, What 
Hath God Wrought, 396. 
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Carolina should not secede. In the Fall of 1828, Calhoun did just that, releasing a treatise 
entitled The South Carolina Exposition. In it, Calhoun argued that protective tariffs, like the 
“Tariff of Abominations,” were unconstitutional and that if a state did not approve of the 
federal law then they could hold a convention and vote on whether the law would become 
null and void in the state. Though Calhoun did not go as far as saying it at the time, the idea 
of nullification opened the door for a state to secede if the federal government attempted to 
coerce a state into obeying a law that the state thought unconstitutional. On November 12, 
1832, South Carolina put Calhoun’s theory of nullification to the test and held a convention 
that overwhelmingly voted in favor of nullifying the “Tariff of Abominations.”43 
Enraged by South Carolina’s affront to his power, Jackson issued a proclamation that 
threatened to use force to coerce the state to comply with the tariff. Jackson’s actions during 
the crisis earned him the approval of some North Carolinians for his unionism, though others 
worried about his willingness to use the power of the federal government to coerce a state. 
Lack of support from other southern states led South Carolina to quiet its desire to secede in 
1832. The Compromise Tariff of 1833, which lowered the tax rate of the “Tariff of 
Abominations,” did little to ease the fears of those concerned by Jackson’s actions, and his 
war against the Second Bank of the United States proved divisive enough to spawn an 
entirely new political party in opposition to him.44 
Jackson’s war on the Second Bank of the United States proved a major political 
blunder for the once seemingly infallible General. This mistake cost Jackson and the 
 
43 It is worth noting that South Carolina politics were very different that those in other states at the 
time. Since South Carolina did not democratize its elections in the early 1800s like many other states. Howe, 
What Hath God Wrought, 396-8, 401-2. 
44 It is some interest to note that “North Carolina was the only southern state whose congressional 
delegation had uniformly opposed every tariff measure since the War of 1812, Williams, “Foundations of the 
Whig Party,” 117-8. 
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Democratic Party the support of about half of all Americans, including Badger, and the 
economic ramifications tainted Jackson’s successor Martin Van Buren’s presidency, putting 
Jackson’s political legacy in jeopardy. Propagated by Jackson’s distrust of banks, his 
dismantling of the Second Bank came three years before its charter was set to expire. Jackson 
accomplished the destruction of the Second Bank by removing all funds from it and 
transferring them to hand-picked state banks. This action gave Jackson’s opponents a 
unifying cause to rally behind, an opportunity that they did not squander.45 
The outcry against Jackson’s removal of funds from the Second Bank of the United 
States came swiftly and harshly in North Carolina. Commenting on Jackson’s willful 
ignorance towards the laws of the United States, the Charlotte Journal, echoed the cries of 
most other North Carolinians, stating, “it is the avowed disregard of all law but the law of his 
own will, the tone of arrogance and contempt of the Legislative Authority of the Country, 
which pervades it, and which must make every independent mind [full of] indignation and 
alarm.” The newspaper continued for several more sentences before ending its expression of 
discontent towards Jackson on a question that many people of the era would have found 
alarming, “are we to see a Cromwell in our day?”46 
Vice President Martin Van Buren was Jackson’s heir apparent, following Jackson’s 
two terms in office. The Whig Party saw this transition as an opportunity to strike and stop a 
possible Jacksonian dynasty, though their strategy to do so proved quite contrived. 
 
45 Williams, “Foundations of the Whig Party,” 118-20. 
46 Charlotte Journal, October 5, 1833; Cromwell refers to Oliver Cromwell, the tyrant that gained 
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Recorder, June 4, 1834; Fayetteville Observer, October 15, 1833, January 28, 1834; Western Carolinian 
(Salisbury), March 22, 1834; Williams, “Foundations of the Whig Party,” 120. 
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Undoubtedly influenced by John Quincy Adams’ victory over Jackson in 1824, the Whig 
strategy during the election of 1836 – the first in which a Whig candidate ran for President – 
was to split the electoral college up amongst five candidates, four of them Whigs. The 
success of this plan rested on Van Buren’s inability to reach the required 148 electoral votes 
to become President, allowing the House of Representatives to pick the new Commander and 
Chief. The Whigs proved unsuccessful in their attempt, however, as Van Buren received 170 
electoral votes. The four Whig candidates—William Henry Harrison, Daniel Webster, Willie 
Mangum, and Hugh L. White—earned seventy-three, fourteen, eleven, and twenty-seven 
electoral votes each, respectively.47 
In North Carolina, the race was primarily between Van Buren and White. During the 
election, several North Carolinian newspapers voiced their disgust with Van Buren. The 
Fayetteville Observer claimed, “Van Buren is the candidate of the abolitionists,” no doubt 
attempting to differentiate Van Buren from his slave-owning predecessor Jackson.48 
Objecting to the criticism that a vote for White was the same as throwing one’s vote away, 
one North Carolinian stated in the Greensboro Patriot, “No! Even if our votes were thrown 
away it would be done with a clearer conscience than in giving them to a man whom we 
should not believe deserved them.”49 Despite these outcries, Van Buren carried the state by 
six percentage points. 
While the national Whig Party worked hard to gain support during the 1836 
Presidential election, the North Carolina Whig Party made in-roads of its own. Tarheel state 
Whigs coalesced over the improvement of the state’s socio-economic issues using positive 
 
47 Marc Kruman, Parties and Politics in North Carolina, 1836-1865 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 
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48 Fayetteville Observer, November 10, 1836. 
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action. Poor roads, less than ideal harbors, and a lack of educational facilities led to a high 
rate of poverty along with social and economic stagnation in North Carolina. The Whig Party 
saw this as an opportunity to oppose the Democratic Party, which did not support the use of 
government funds to promote education and internal improvements. The Whig Party’s 
policies made them immensely popular in the western and coastal sound regions of North 
Carolina, but a major problem stood in their way: the political dominance of eastern counties 
in state politics. This dominance was baked into North Carolina’s original state Constitution 
of 1776, which gave eastern counties more representation in the state’s House of 
Representatives. By 1830, western North Carolinians outnumbered easterners by over 
50,000, but only had eighty representatives compared to the east’s one-hundred and 
nineteen.50 
Defections from key counties around North Carolina’s sounds due to their want of 
internal improvements to upgrade their harbors and increase trade gave the west enough 
votes to hold a state Constitutional Convention in 1835.51 The convention made six important 
changes to the North Carolina State Constitution. First, the state Senate now contained fifty 
members from equally drawn districts based on the amount of taxes they paid. Second, one-
hundred and twenty members apportioned by the federal population now made up the House 
of Commons with each county getting at least one representative. Third, the General 
Assembly now met every two years instead of one. Fourth, it eliminated borough 
representation and religious tests for officeholding. Fifth, the citizens of North Carolina 
elected the governor by popular vote and he now held office for two years. Sixth, to appease 
 
50 Williams, “Foundations of the Whig Party,” 121-2, 123; Badger, who became known as one of the 
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51 Hillsborough Recorder, April 17, 1835, quoted in Williams, “Foundations of the Whig Party,” 123. 
21 
 
slaveholders who largely hailed from the eastern counties, free people of color lost the right 
to vote. North Carolina adopted the new state Constitution of 1835 by a vote of 26,771 to 
21,606.52 
The increased voting power given to western North Carolina, along with the support 
of key counties around North Carolina’s coast, allowed the Whig Party to quickly dominate 
the state. The western and sound counties supported the Whig Party because of their desire 
for internal improvements, though like most North Carolinians, they shuddered at the thought 
of increased taxes. Henry Clay relieved these concerns with his distribution bill, which 
proposed to divide the money generated by public land sales amongst the states, therefore, 
giving North Carolina Whigs the money, they needed for internal improvements without 
them having to raise taxes. Thanks to these policies, made possible by the more equal 
sectional voting power enshrined in the 1835 North Carolina State Constitution, the Whig 
Party gained control of North Carolina politics in 1836 and maintained control until 1850.53 
With the North Carolina and National Whig parties in a good position to strike, the 
1840 Presidential election appeared like their chance to defeat Jacksonian policies by ousting 
Van Buren from the White House. The National Whig Party gained a large, loyal, and 
passionate following during the years between the party’s founding and the election of 1840. 
This rise in popularity can be attributed to the party’s push for positive governmental action 
 
52 Raleigh Register, December 29, 1835, quoted in Williams, “Foundations of the Whig Party,” 123; 
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for internal improvements and economic expansion. The popularity of the Whig Party, their 
choice of William Henry Harrison, a popular general, as their presidential candidate, and 
some increased effort by the Democrats to stop them, led to a voter turnout of over eighty 
percent in 1840, an increase of more than twenty-three percent from the previous election.54 
In North Carolina, the rise of the state’s Whig Party, along with Van Buren’s 
unpopularity, turned what once was a solidly Democratic state during Jackson’s two turns, 
into a hotbed of Whig support in 1840. The Fayetteville Observer, a Whig paper, succinctly 
summarized the level of fervent Whig sentiment in the state: 
We beg every friend of Harrison and Reform…faithfully to do his duty 
[and]…save the good old North State from everlasting disgrace…let every 
Whig be able to say that his vote aided to bring back the government to a state 
of purity, and the country to a condition of prosperity, which we may 
confidently look for as the result of the election of Harrison and Tyler.55 
 
The writers of the Fayetteville Observer were pleased to know that their faith in the voters of 
North Carolina had not been misplaced when the results of the 1840 election came back. 
Harrison carried North Carolina by sixteen percent. The national election mirrored this 
dramatic shift towards Harrison and the Whig Party, with Harrison receiving 234 electoral 
votes to Van Buren’s 60, enough to easily put the first member of the Whig Party in the 
White House.56 
 Badger played a significant role in the ascension of the Whig Party to the presidency, 
and the party’s rise to power catapulted Badger onto the stage of national politics. Badger’s 
moment came when he gave a speech in favor of Harrison and the Whig Party in Granville 
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County on March 3, 1840.57 Reporting on the speech, the Carolina Watchman, a newspaper 
out of Salisbury, North Carolina, noted: “Mr. Badger rose by request and addressed the 
meeting for nearly two hours. He portrayed the abnormalities of the [current] 
administration…whose sole aim seems to be to…cripple the resources of this country.” 
Badger’s speech was well received by the audience, with Badger being forced to stop 
speaking several times due to deafening applause. All those who spoke after Badger, “paid a 
glowing compliment to Badger’s zeal and eloquence.” Giving their own opinion of the 
speech, the paper stated, “we are rejoiced to learn that the immense powers of Mr. Badger are 
so actually employed in ridding the country of the curse of misgovernment.” The paper 
argued that Badger “never advocated a cause when more was at stake, nor did he ever have a 
better opportunity of entitling himself to the gratitude of posterity.”58 The Raleigh Register 
also noted that Badger’s speech could “safely be referred to as the text-book of the [Whig] 
party.”59 
 The respect and admiration that Badger earned from his March 3rd speech, convinced 
the North Carolina Whig Party to recommend him for the position of Attorney General in 
Harrison’s cabinet, a position that state Whigs felt Badger was well suited for due to his 
experience as a judge and lawyer. Harrison took this recommendation to heart, but having 
already appointed John J. Crittenden as Attorney General, Harrison appointed Badger as 
Secretary of the Navy instead.60 Coincidentally, being from North Carolina, Badger fit the 
role of Secretary of the Navy just as well as he would have fit the role of Attorney General. 
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This was because North Carolina dominated the production of American naval stores, 
producing up to ninety-seven percent of the turpentine used by the Navy, giving Badger a 
home-field advantage when it came to procuring goods for the improvement of the Navy.61 
 During his tenure as Secretary of the Navy, Badger implemented several changes and 
improvements. Firstly, he recommended establishing a fleet to defend the nation’s coastline, 
an action that Congress took, establishing the origins of the Atlantic fleet. Secondly, he 
introduced a new haircut in the Navy which was affectionately called “the Badger” for 
decades after his departure. Perhaps the most glowing praise of his time as the Secretary of 
the Navy came from the Philadelphia Inquirer and Daily Courier, which wrote, “we have 
been called upon by a number of officers of the Navy [who have stated]…that never was the 
Department characterized by more efficiency, vigor, and ability than during the brief but 
brilliant administration of the Honorable George Edmund Badger.”62 
 Unfortunately for Badger, and perhaps even more so the country as a whole, “brilliant 
but brief” may be the best description for both his time as Secretary of the Navy and the 
initial success of the National Whig Party. The sudden death of President William Henry 
Harrison one month into his first term caused a fracture in the Whig Party which had just 
found success. John Tyler, or “His Accidency” as his detractors liked to call him, succeeded 
to the Presidency and confounded Whig plans to reform the government and the nation. 
Upon taking office, Tyler immediately vetoed several of the economic bills, including the 
recharter of the Second Bank, that congressional Whigs had recently passed with the 
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assurance that Harrison would sign them. This created an uncrossable divide between the 
Whig Party and Tyler.63 
Tyler, trying to save his political career, made the expansion of slavery one of his key 
issues, with the annexation of Texas as his goal. Tyler’s actions as president led him to be 
read out of the Whig Party by congressional Whigs, and his unpopularity caused the 
Democratic Party to overlook him as a candidate for the 1844 Presidential election. The 
Whig Party’s break with Tyler caused all his cabinet, save Daniel Webster, to resign, leaving 
Badger uncertain whether he would ever return to the stage of national politics. Tyler’s final 
and most damaging act as president, his annexation of Texas two days before he left office, 
initiated an era of turmoil for the United States that did not end until three-quarters of a 
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Chapter Two: Compromise, 1841-1850 
 The tension amongst the citizens of the United States reached the highest level it had 
ever been in 1850. On January 29, 1850, Henry Clay proposed his compromise plan to deal 
with the land ceded to the United States by Mexico after the Mexican American War, as well 
as several other key issues of the time. What became known as the Compromise of 1850 
included legislation to admit California into the Union as a free state, organize the territories 
of Utah and New Mexico without reference to slavery, settle the Texas-New Mexico border 
dispute, abolish the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and create a new and more 
stringent Fugitive Slave Law.65 Congressional members from both sides of the aisle found 
reasons to become enraged at some aspect of these proposals. Hoping to be a voice of reason 
and a beacon of compromise, North Carolina’s George Edmund Badger took the Senate floor 
on March 18 and 19, 1850, to deliver a speech on the slavery question.66 
 A seasoned lawyer and skilled orator, Badger addressed the Senate with authority, 
being “recognized as one of the ablest constitutional lawyers in the country, and when 
speaking on constitutional questions was…listened to with respect by the Senate.”67 After 
Badger discussed how he had opposed the taking of land from Mexico and his distaste for the 
current fervor surrounding secession, he got to the heart of his argument: compromise and 
the Constitution. Opposing Senator William Henry Seward of New York who had argued 
that the Fugitive Slave Act was immoral and should not be passed even if it was 
constitutional, Badger stated: 
He who obeys the Constitution only in what he thinks right, does not obey the 
Constitution at all – he but follows his own inclination; and he who, having 
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taken an oath to support the Constitution, refuses to obey it because he thinks 
there is some “law above the Constitution” which forbids slavery, places 
himself in the same position – taking for his guide his own individual 
judgment and opinion, above and against the Constitution, which he can 
rightfully do only after surrendering the office he holds…68 
 
Badger practiced what he preached by arguing against his section – the South – and his own 
personal interests. When discussing the application of the Wilmot Proviso, an amendment 
that would have barred slavery from any of the territories gained by way of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican War in 1848, Badger stated, “I say again, that 
Congress has the constitutional power to apply the Wilmot proviso to this Territory, and to 
all Territories that belong to the United States.” Continuing his speech in favor of federal 
power, Badger declared, “I believe that Congress has entire power and jurisdiction over the 
Territories; that we are the supreme lawgivers over them; may dispose of their institutions as 
we think right, and let in and shut out just whom and just what we please.”69 
 Badger’s statements and actions during his speech, “On the Slavery Question,” are 
consistent with those that he put forth during debates both before and after the Compromise 
of 1850. Badger’s rigid constitutionalism remained consistent throughout his career, even 
carrying over into the debates that he participated in as one of Wake County’s representatives 
to North Carolina’s secession conventions in February and May of 1861. During a time when 
the United States was a ship sailing straight into the rocks while the majority of the crew 
were too preoccupied with advancing their sectional and personal causes to correct its course, 
Badger grounded his rhetoric in the Constitution and the spirit of compromise. If more 
politicians followed Badger’s lead and placed the interests of the nation over their own 
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personal interests, then perhaps compromise would have prevailed and avoided the Civil 
War. 
*** 
One of the most transformative and consequential decades in the history of the United 
States, 1840 to 1850, saw several events that shaped the nation. The annexation of Texas in 
1845, the outbreak of the Mexican-American War in 1846, and the Compromise of 1850, all 
led to the Kansas-Nebraska Act that passed in 1854, the catalysts for the Civil War.70 Being 
one of only four senators to continuously serve from the first year of the Mexican American 
War until the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and to have recorded a vote on both the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, George Edmund Badger 
contributed heavily to the debates and discussions surrounding the most crucial pieces of 
legislation in American history.71 
 After Badger’s brief tenure as Secretary of the Navy, he returned to his home in 
Raleigh and continued practicing law. During that time, Badger continued making a name for 
himself, arguing in over twenty-five percent of the cases heard before the North Carolina 
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Supreme Court between 1841 and 1846.72 Along with his continued advancement as a 
lawyer, Badger increased his wealth and social standing as well during the antebellum era. In 
1840, Badger owned eighteen slaves, putting him on the fringes of the planter class and 
leading to a sizeable amount of wealth.73 By 1850, however, his real estate wealth was listed 
as $6,00074, but his slaveholdings had decreased to five, perhaps due to him selling off many 
of his slaves during his tenure in the Senate.75 After his time in the Senate, Badger continued 
to increase his slaveholdings and wealth, and by 1860 was worth a reported $145,00076 and 
owned twenty slaves, making him one of the wealthiest men in North Carolina and the fifth 
wealthiest person in Raleigh.77 Badger’s standing in the planter class, and the wealth that he 
accumulated as a result, make his decisions in Congress all that more interesting. Unlike the 
typical antebellum politicians, vilified by historian Michael F. Holt, who only voted for what 
best benefited them personally and politically, Badger always voted for what he viewed as 
the constitutional, and usually compromise, choice.78 
 By 1841, the Whig Party in North Carolina was still in the early phase of its state 
dominance, which lasted from 1836 to 1851.79 But at the national level, the Whig Party was 
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in turmoil because of the actions of President John Tyler. Many North Carolinians disagreed 
with Tyler. The Wilmington Chronicle, a Whig newspaper, stated, “Although not surprised, 
we are mortified and disappointed at” the veto of the national bank legislation. The editor 
stated that Tyler’s scruples “seem to be of that shadowy character which prevents their being 
met by practical purposes.”80 Not to be outdone in their outrage, the Whig Oxford Mercury, 
denounced the president: “How closely [Tyler] follows in the footsteps of General Jackson!... 
How [had the presidential office] increased his arrogance! How alas! Has it inspired him with 
a dictatorial consequence!”81 The editors asserted, “we [feel] mortified, abused, that such 
should be our President, and we would that the curtain of oblivion might forever hide his 
disgusting conduct.”82 
 Though some Democratic newspapers defended Tyler, their voices were few and far 
between because twenty-nine of North Carolinas thirty-nine newspapers were Whig 
affiliated.83 Along with condemning Tyler’s actions, the citizens of North Carolina praised 
those that resigned from his cabinet and held out hope that the Whigs in Congress would be 
able to overcome Tyler’s intransigence. The Wilmington Chronicle, a Whig paper, wrote, 
“We must hope for the best. Another session of Congress will come on in less than three 
months, and all the other great measures of the Whig Party having been perfected this 
session, ample time will then be afforded to” the creation of a new fiscal plan.84 
 
80 Wilmington Chronicle, September 15, 1841. 
81 Oxford Mercury (Oxford, North Carolina), September 16, 1841. 
82 Oxford Mercury, September 16, 1841. 
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 The people of North Carolina were ready to show their displeasure for the Tyler 
administration at the polls during the midterm elections in 1842, but the midterm elections 
happened later in North Carolina than they did in many states, occurring on August 3, 1843. 
Likely, the prolonged cooling-off period between Tyler’s veto of the Second Bank of the 
United States and the midterm elections saved Tyler and his new bedfellows, the Democratic 
Party, from losing votes in North Carolina. In the previous Congress, North Carolina Whigs 
held eight of the state’s thirteen seats in the House of Representatives, but during the 
midterms of 1842, North Carolina lost four seats due to reapportionment based on the 1850 
census, leaving it with only nine in the House. Unfortunately for the Whigs, all four of North 
Carolina’s lost seats were from Whig districts, leaving the Whigs with four seats in the 
House of Representatives, and Democrats with five.85 
 Despite what appeared to be a drastic defeat during the midterms, North Carolina 
Whigs were full of hope. Tyler’s attempt to rejoin the Democratic Party failed after the 
Democrats refused to accept him, and after his removal, the Whig Party began to excel once 
more. The North State Whig echoed this sentiment in a column released on the day of the 
North Carolina midterms, “His defection has powerfully aided our adversaries and given 
them a temporary predominance, but now, and hereafter, they are to be sufferers from his 
association with them…”86 This sentiment proved to be prophetic, as the Democratic Party 
chose to ignore Tyler’s desire for re-election and instead nominated the dark horse candidate, 
James K. Polk of Tennessee, to run in 1844.  
 The North State Whig’s statement proved partially correct, with the Whig candidate 
Henry Clay carrying North Carolina in 1844. However, Polk narrowly won the national 
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election. Polk’s presidency reinvigorated the Whig Party in both North Carolina, and the 
United States as a whole. Much of the 1844 election in the South revolved around which 
candidate was the friendliest to slavery. The Whig North Carolina Star claimed, “The 
Richmond Enquirer [was] sedulously endeavoring to create the impression that if Mr. Clay is 
elected, he will owe his election to a ‘coalition’ between the Whigs and the Abolitionists.”87 
The Star combated this view by stating “we perceive that…the Abolitionist or Liberty 
candidate has openly avowed his preference to Mr. Polk over Mr. Clay. Is not the democratic 
party opposed, as a mass, to human slavery!”88 This distaste for Polk continued after his 
election, with the Asheville Messenger stating, “There will be, doubtless, great rejoicing in 
Europe when the news of Mr. Polk’s election reaches that country. He was regarded by the 
Europeans as the anti-American candidate, being opposed to the encouragement of American 
industry.” The editor wrote, “After four years of misery and suffering, we shall be able to 
elect an American president.”89 
 Once Polk became president, he set about expanding the United States under the 
banner of manifest destiny. The biggest swath of land that Polk desired, California, belonged 
to Mexico, and Polk’s plan to obtain it led to the United States instigating a conflict to get 
it.90 Despite Polk’s role in starting the Mexican American War, it was his predecessor, John 
Tyler, that agreed to annex Texas on his final day in office.91 Under an annexation bill placed 
before Congress by Tennessee Whig Milton Brown, Texas would enter the Union as a slave 
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state and could be broken into five separate slave states by future Congresses.92 Polk, 
breaking a promise he had made to Van Burenite Democrats in New York, allowed Tyler’s 
offer to Texas to stand, and in December 1845, Texas was admitted into the United States as 
a slave state, with its border with Mexico recognized, by the United States, as the Rio 
Grande.93 
 Texas’ border with Mexico became a heated issue, with Mexico recognizing the 
border as the Nueces River and the United States recognizing the border as the Rio Grande. 
Polk, seeing this as an opportunity to gain the land he wanted from Mexico, sent General 
Zachary Taylor, along with a group of soldiers, to the Rio Grande. Mexican troops, seeing 
these soldiers as invaders, opened fire on them. This altercation allowed President Polk to ask 
Congress for a declaration of war against Mexico, and on May 14, 1846, Congress gave Polk 
what he wanted. Despite their discontent with Polk’s justification for the conflict, the vast 
majority of Whigs voted in favor of the war, quite possibly because Polk’s framing of the 
initial skirmish as Mexican troops spilling “American Blood on American Soil” made it 
difficult for Whigs to justify what seemed to be an un-patriotic vote against war.94 
 Americans put their partisan views aside to come together and fight, regardless of 
whether they felt the war had been instigated by dubious means. The Whig Raleigh Register 
argued, “we are glad to see that, everywhere, the American spirit is fully up, and that every 
citizen, without reference to the blunders of the Administration, seems determined to do his 
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duty, his whole duty, to his country.”95 Though this burst of patriotism helped carry the 
United States into the Mexican American War, the longer the war dragged on, the more 
unpopular it, and the Polk administration became. 
 The 1846 midterms were a blow to President Polk who had, up to that point, enjoyed 
a wide Democratic majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Whigs 
everywhere in the nation experienced a notable resurgence on the heels of the growing 
unpopularity of the Mexican American War. This was also true for the Whig Party in North 
Carolina who doubled their number of representatives in the House, giving them a two to one 
majority over their Democratic counterparts. But as the Whig Party was celebrating its return 
to dominance in Congress, controversial legislative initiatives led to heated partisan debates 
on the future of slavery in the Mexican territories. 
 The Wilmot Proviso was the piece of legislation that split the United States’ political 
discourse into sectional rather than partisan debate. Pennsylvania Democrat David Wilmot 
called for slavery to be barred from any territory gained from Mexico as a result of the war.96 
Historian Eric Foner summed up the impact of the Wilmot Proviso: “If any event in 
American history can be singled out as the beginning of a path which led almost inevitably to 
sectional controversy and civil war, it was the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso.”97 When 
Congress first voted on the Proviso “every Northerner, save four Democrats, supported it” 
while “every Southerner, regardless of party, opposed it.”98 The situation became so heated 
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that many southerners eventually threatened to secede if the Proviso ever passed. Into this 
rancorous climate, George Badger entered the Senate.  
 Badger’s knowledge and respect for the Constitution likely caused the North Carolina 
Whig Party to elect him to the United States Senate in 1846 to fill the post held by William 
H. Haywood, a Democrat, who had recently resigned his position over a disagreement with 
the State legislature about opinions on the tariff.99 Badger was highly respected by the state’s 
Whig Party, so much so that one North Carolinian stated in the Raleigh Register, “it is 
coincident worthy of remark, that in both instances where [federal] office has been conferred 
on Mr. Badger, it has been not only without his solicitation, but…while [he was] absent from 
the city, without ever intimating to any human being that he would accept the 
appointment.”100 Undoubtedly, Badger’s standing in society as a slaveholder, lawyer, and 
man of means swayed the North Carolina state legislature to elect him to the Senate. 
Historian Marc Kruman noted that 82 percent of North Carolina state legislatures were 
slaveholders, with many of them being part of the “planter” class, making Badger their peer 
socially and economically, and someone that the state legislature entrusted to champion their 
interests in the Senate.101  
The North Carolina State Legislature decided to place their trust in Badger despite 
some of them having concerns about his standing as the leading “Federal Whig” in the state. 
Many Legislators’ misgivings about Badger came from his “allegedly extreme Federal views 
on the powers of Congress relative to slavery in the territories,” while some others 
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complained about Badger being from the Piedmont and not the coast or mountains, a sign of 
the sectional tension that played a large part in the state-level politics of antebellum North 
Carolina.102  Ultimately, Badger’s loyalty lay not to himself or his party, but to the 
Constitution of the United States, and because of this, Badger supported the Union, 
compromise, and slavery.  
 Upon Badger’s appointment to the Senate, Whigs in North Carolina and Washington 
D.C. rejoiced. The Raleigh Register stated that “not one [Senator] will be found [Badger’s] 
superior, in all those qualities of both head and heart, which constitute true greatness, and 
this opinion will be endorsed by the whole country before his term expires.”103 During his 
tenure in the Senate, Badger served on several committees and delivered many speeches. We 
can best understand Badger’s way of thinking by examining his speeches on the slavery 
question, the territorial question, and the Nebraska Bill, as well as his votes on the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, the bills of the Compromise of 1850, and the Kansas Nebraska Act.104 
 The first consequential vote that Badger participated in was the ratification of the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the treaty that sought to bring an end to the Mexican American 
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War. By the time the war was winding down, at the end of 1847, North Carolinians had 
grown increasingly frustrated with the whole affair. The Whig Fayetteville Observer 
published a speech given by Henry Clay, in which Clay stated: “War, pestilence, and famine, 
by the common consent of mankind, are the three greatest calamities which can befall our 
species; and war, as the most direful, justly stands foremost and in front.”105 Once Congress 
reconvened following its Christmas recess, Badger echoed the sentiment of Clay and the rest 
of the Whig Party: “the war in which we are now engaged with Mexico, was the immediate 
result of the unlawful and unconstitutional act of the President of the United States.”106 
Badger elaborated on his theme: “I suppose, sir, that there is no gentleman on this floor or 
elsewhere, who supposes or believes that the President of the United States is vested with the 
war power of this country. It is a power expressly, and in terms, conferred upon the Congress 
of the United States.”107 In Badger’s opinion, Polk robbed Congress of and absconded with, 
the power to enter the United States into a war when Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor to 
the Rio Grande, which the people of Mexico saw as an act of aggression by the United 
States.  
 Shortly after Badger voiced his distaste for President Polk’s actions, the finger-
pointing over who or what caused the Mexican American War ceased to matter when the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo made its way to the Senate floor on February 23, 1848.108 The 
Senate moved with uncharacteristic haste, ratifying the treaty within two weeks of receiving 
it. Within those two weeks, several heated debates occurred, especially over two proposed 
amendments to the treaty. Jefferson Davis, a Democratic senator from Mississippi, 
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introduced an amendment to the treaty on March 6 that called for the boundary between 
Texas and Mexico to be moved south so that much of what is present-day northern Mexico 
would have become part of Texas. Davis undoubtedly introduced this amendment to gain 
more slave territory to benefit the southern United States. Most senators knew that Davis’ 
amendment would be unacceptable to Mexico and voted down the amendment.109 
 Badger introduced the second amendment to the treaty on March 8, in which he 
called for the deletion of all territorial acquisition from the treaty. A slight majority of the 
Whigs in the Senate voted for Badger’s amendment, but the amendment inevitably failed 
after causing much concern amongst those Whigs who wanted to end the war and Democrats 
who demanded the acquisition of territory.110 After voting down both amendments, the 
Senate quickly voted to ratify the treaty and end the unpopular war. On March 10, the Senate 
voted 38 to 14 in favor of ratification, with Badger voting against it. After the Mexican 
government approved the treaty, both countries adopted the final version on May 30.111 
 The anxious citizens of North Carolina awaited news on the Senate’s ratification of 
the treaty.  On March 21, the Senate’s decision finally reached the state, when The 
Fayetteville Weekly Observer, a Whig leaning paper, declared: “This has been a day of 
tedious and harassing session in the Senate, but one of vast importance to the Country, so far 
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as the action of that chamber can contribute to the great result of producing peace, though a 
treaty.”112 The Eastern Carolina Republican, a Democratic newspaper from New Bern, 
agreed,  “The terms of the treaty must be satisfactory to nearly all the people of the U.S. – 
Large cessions of territory is made to us valuable for its location and resources.”113 The 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo resolved one tumultuous matter but unleashed an even larger 
conundrum that Congress had to solve.  
 If Badger looked forward to any amount of stress-free time following the ratification 
of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, he was sorely mistaken, as he had to deal with his 
upcoming reelection at the end of 1848.114 Badger was uncertain of his reelection despite 
“[making] his name very rapidly in the Senate.”115 Badger’s weakness in the eyes of the 
North Carolina State Legislature came from what his detractors called “his extreme federal 
notions.” He was also “considered unsafe on the slavery question by many slaveholders.”116 
Many of those perceived “notions” stemmed from Badger’s views on the Wilmot Proviso, 
and other legislation regarding what to do with the western territory gained from Mexico. 
Badger’s views made him unpopular with the states’ rights sect of the Whig Party in North 
Carolina. Writing to John J. Crittenden, Badger stated, “My re-election is very doubtful – the 
chances are against it.”117 
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 Despite Badger’s doubts and some fervor from the more extreme portions of the 
Whig Party, Badger gained the endorsement of the majority of Whigs in the North Caroline 
Legislature with ease.  However, three Whigs broke from party ranks, causing Badger to fall 
one vote shy of being re-elected on the first three ballots.118 After Badger failed to gain the 
nomination, the Democrats, who up to that point had been spreading their votes around 
amongst several different candidates, decided to rally behind Thomas L. Clingman, a Whig 
from Western North Carolina who was sympathetic to the Democrats.119 The Democrats 
hoped that Clingman would attract Whigs who were unhappy with Badger, giving Clingman 
enough support to carry the election. This tactic appeared to be gaining steam on the fourth 
ballot, with Clingman accumulating fifty-five votes and causing Badger to lose seven votes, 
putting Badger at a total of seventy-five, with the remaining votes still being spread out 
amongst several other candidates. Clingman’s supporters continued to persuade people over 
to his side, giving Clingman sixty-seven votes on the fifth ballot. However, by this time, 
support for any other candidate besides Badger or Clingman all but dried up, and Badger 
succeeded in securing the eighty-three votes he needed for re-election. As Badger and his 
supporters in the Whig Party celebrated a hard-fought victory, they were unaware that it 
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would be their last, as Badger was the last Whig to be elected to the United States Senate 
from North Carolina.120 
 Upon Badger’s re-election, the Whig Mecklenburg Jeffersonian reported that “the 
Whigs applauded tremendously when the result was announced, so great their savage joy 
over the defeat of ‘Clingman and the devil,’ to use an expression of their own.” The paper 
continued, contending that in “the North [Badger’s re-election] will be claimed as a Free Soil 
victory, and they will claim it so correctly; for the Whigs in North Carolina will support 
anything [Badger] dictates.”121 Though, by far the best example of unbridled joy regarding 
Badger’s re-election came from the Whig Mountain Banner in Rutherfordton, North 
Carolina. The paper stated, “it would have been a burning shame to the Whigs of North 
Carolina had they flinched in their support of the able, eloquent, and high-souled Badger – a 
man at once of extraordinary genius and of spotless purity.”122 Comparing Badger to the 
other politicians in Washington D.C., the Mountain Banner noted, “the Senate and the 
Country may be proud of the services of such a man, unlike the reptile race of politicians 
who crawl into high stations.”123 Other North Carolinians were not as thrilled about Badger’s 
re-election, with the Democratic Eastern Carolina Republican stating, “above all, we hope 
that our friends will see to it that we have a Senator in Congress who is sound on the slavery 
question…that would be one thing, and the re-election of Mr. Badger another.”124 
 After Badger survived his heated re-election, he found himself in the inferno that was 
Congress during the 1849-1850 session. Tensions ran high as Congress debated the issue of 
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slavery in the newly acquired Mexican territories. When California applied for statehood as a 
free state, these debates pitted free-soilers against southerners, leading to open talk of 
disunion by several southern members of Congress. In December 1849, Representative 
Robert Y. Toombs of Georgia stated on the floor of the House of Representatives: “if by your 
legislation you seek to drive us from the territories of California and New Mexico, thereby 
attempting to fix a national degradation upon half the states, I am for disunion.”125  
Statements like Toombs’ worried moderate men like Henry Clay, who announced his 
compromise in the Senate on January 29, 1850.126 
 The whole of Clay’s compromise seemed to be disagreeable to the vast majority of 
congressmen--southerners opposed the admission of California as a free state and northerners 
hated the inclusion of a stricter Fugitive Slave Law. Perhaps the ability to be unfavorable to 
everyone involved is the sign of a well-balanced compromise. Despite the introduction of 
Clay’s compromise, southerners called for a convention in Nashville, Tennessee, to discuss 
whether secession was necessary.127 The secessionist sentiment from the South was met with 
hostility and threats from President Zachary Taylor, who announced that any secession 
would be crushed, an action that would have very likely led to the American Civil War 
occurring a decade early. With tempers at an all-time high, Michael Birkner stated 
Americans had two choices: “fight with one another or calm down and accept some middle 
ground” by way of compromise.128 
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 Clay’s compromise seemed destined to fail until the death of President Taylor in the 
summer of 1850 led to Vice President Millard Fillmore’s accession to the office. Unlike his 
predecessor, Fillmore was a staunch believer in compromise and pushed for the end of 
hostilities surrounding the expansion of slavery in the western territories.  Fillmore’s pro-
compromise stance, along with Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois’ ability to break Clay’s 
omnibus bill into several individual bills, allowed for every measure of Clay’s original 
compromise to pass by the end of 1850.129 
 Badger’s contribution to the debate surrounding the Compromise of 1850 was 
sizeable. Along with his speech “On the Slavery Question,” Badger also delivered a speech 
before the Senate, “On the Territorial Question,” in which he denounced secessionist fervor 
and spoke for the admission of California as a free state, while also arguing for the expansion 
of slavery and a stricter Fugitive Slave Act.130 Badger opened up his August 2, 1850 speech 
“On the Territorial Question” by discussing the admission of California, stating, “I much 
prefer California, if admitted at all, admitted with the whole extent of boundary which it 
claims. I prefer it because, if we are to have a free state upon the Pacific, it is far better to 
have one than two.”131 Badger stated that he was for the admission of California despite his 
feelings towards the admission of new States. Badger further stated, “I am not desirous of 
adding to the number of these States, whether the addition is of free or of slaveholding States. 
I look upon it as a great calamity that the country should be placed in a situation that makes it 
necessary that other States shall be admitted into the Union.” He further argued, “if my own 
 
129 Birkner, “The Crisis of Union,” 172-3. 
130 Badger, “On the Territorial Question;” Badger, “On the Slavery Question.” 
131 Badger, “On the Territorial Question,” 1. 
44 
 
wishes could prevail, there should never be another State added to it from this day forth to 
the end of time.”132 
Badger, arguing that California should be admitted into the Union, as a free state 
nonetheless, despite his expressed views against the addition of States, shows that Badger 
willingly voiced support for measures that he did not necessarily agree with, all in the spirit 
of compromise. Following his support for compromise, Badger argued against the idea of 
seceding from the Union if California was a free state, “taking measures, in any way looking 
to a dissolution of the Union, because we are not at liberty to carry slaves to California. Why, 
there seems to be no proportion under heaven between the small, almost indiscernible 
premises and the vast portentous conclusions.”133 Speaking for himself, Badger added, “I 
hold myself as having no right to go out of the Union – no right to destroy it – and I have no 
wish if I had that right to do so.”134 
 Badger began his argument for a stricter Fugitive Slave Act in his speech “On the 
Slavery Question,” delivered before the Senate on March 18 and 19, 1850, with an obligatory 
defense of slavery that every southerner seemed to produce during any argument surrounding 
the peculiar institution. Badger’s defense of slavery sounded familiar to his fellow 
congressmen. An Episcopalian, Badger quoted a passage from the Bible and stated: “among 
the many direct, positive, authoritative approvals by God himself of the institution of 
slavery…it is not a mere toleration, a mere forbearance to prohibit, but an express 
permission.”135 Once Badger turned his attention towards arguing for a stricter Fugitive Slave 
Act, he stayed true to his belief in the supreme law of the Constitution. Badger asserted that 
 
132 Badger, “On the Territorial Question,” 1. 
133 Badger, “On the Territorial Question,” 6. 
134 Badger, “On the Territorial Question,” 6. 
135 Badger, “On the Slavery Question,” 3. 
45 
 
the South had “a right to ask [for] an effectual bill for the recapture of fugitive slaves,” that 
“this is a claim of right; this is a demand founded upon the Constitution.” He concluded, “if 
there is anything in the Constitution free of doubt, difficulty, or dispute, it is that that 
instrument gives us a right to have our fugitives surrendered to us.”136 Badger was right about 
that third point, as even the staunchest opponents of the Fugitive Slave Act found it hard to 
argue against its constitutionality. 
 Badger concluded his speech by stating, “if [our Northern Friends] suppose Southern 
gentlemen to be wedded to any of the adventitious evils and abuses of slavery…they do us 
great injustice. Upon the rights of property, we stand…[and] we cannot be moved.”137 
However, Badger admitted that more could be done to regulate the evils of slavery. He was 
even willing to permit rules to be passed to do so, stating “but, saving these,” laws that try to 
remove the property of southerners, “make what regulations of police the occasion may 
require, and I will not only submit but will give to them my hearty concurrence and 
approbation.”138 
 On the issue of slavery’s expansion into the territories of Utah and New Mexico, 
Badger thought that “the question of slavery or no slavery in a State is a question proper to be 
decided by the state when its Constitution is formed and when it is about to be admitted into 
the Union.”139 Louisiana senator Pierre Soulé moved to amend the language in the 
compromise to say “when the said Territory…shall be admitted as a state…with or without 
slavery, as their Constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission.”140 Badger noted 
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that with this new language, he would “very cheerfully” support the inclusion of New 
Mexico and Utah into the Union. Most senators felt the same and adopted Soulé’s 
amendment by a vote of 38 to 12.141 
 Lastly, on the topic of abolishing the slave trade in the District of Columbia, Badger 
was “perfectly happy” with voting for such a piece of legislation but felt strongly that 
protections should be included in the bill for slaveholders living there. Badger noted that he 
had “in the existing state of things…a strong objection to voting for the bill,” but “with the 
amendment [for protections for slaveholders] I should have the greatest pleasure in the world 
in voting for it.”142 Badger’s optimism for the bill faded when Senator Seward proposed an 
amendment bill that abolished slavery completely in the District of Columbia while 
compensating slaveholders for their loss. Badger objected to this amendment, not because he 
thought Congress did not have the authority to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, 
but because doing so would make the South feel attacked. Most senators either agreed with 
Badger or opposed Seward’s amendment for their own reasons and rejected it by a large 
vote.143 
 The first of the individual bills in the Compromise of 1850 to go before the Senate 
was the Texas Boundary Bill. This legislation set Texas’ borders at their present-day 
locations, called for the United States Government to pay Texas $5 million in compensation 
for their lost land, and pay another $5 million to the holders of Texas bonds. The Senate, 
including George Badger, voted to approve this bill on August 9, 1850, by a margin of 30-20. 
The passage of the Texas Boundary Bill “broke the logjam” that had stopped the 
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Compromise of 1850, and by the end of September 1850, every one of Clay’s original 
compromise measures had passed in the Senate.144 
 On August 13, 1850, four days after the Senate passed the Texas Boundary Bill, they 
voted on the bill to allow California into the Union as a free state. Perhaps the spirit of 
compromise had found its way into the Senate’s chambers as this bill passed relatively 
quickly after having caused such heated debate earlier in the year. Badger, however, found 
himself conflicted between his two biggest principles when it came time for him to cast his 
vote for the admission of California. On one hand, Badger was one of the staunchest pro-
compromise members of Congress, but on the other, Badger was an acolyte of the 
Constitution. In the end, Badger chose to abstain from voting on the California admission 
bill, because California’s application to become a state came “under circumstances 
unprecedented in the history of this country.”145 Badger’s constitutional issue with 
California’s admission as a state was that California had never been a territory of the United 
States and therefore “the persons acting for California did not have the legal right to apply for 
admission into the Union.”146 
 The vote in the Senate on the next piece of compromise legislation occurred on 
August 15, 1850, two days after admitting California as a state. This bill called for the 
organization of Utah and New Mexico into territories and allowed their state Constitutions to 
either allow or forbid slavery within the state. Being a fan of the popular sovereignty method 
of determining slavery’s expansion, Badger happily voted for this bill. However, no one at 
the time could have predicted the turmoil that the passage of this bill would eventually cause, 
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with the Supreme Court using the precedent of popular sovereignty set by this bill to declare 
the Missouri Compromise null in their decision of the Dred Scott case on March 6, 1857.147 
 Following the rapid-fire passage of several measures from the Compromise of 1850, 
the Senate took a week before they voted on the Fugitive Slave Act. Despite the Act’s ability 
to spark fiery debate, Michael Holt noted that the bill “occasioned surprisingly little 
debate.”148 The Fugitive Slave Act passed by a relatively large margin (27-12) considering its 
contents. Badger voted in favor of the Fugitive Slave Act, unsurprisingly, since it was by far 
the bill that appealed to him the most. Badger stated, “in 1793…the great men of the country, 
who aided in forming this very Constitution, recognized the right of the South, the right of 
slaveholders in the South, to have their slaves delivered” back to them.149A new stricter 
Fugitive Slave Act would also help those Badger represented since people who hailed from 
Upper South and Border states experienced the greatest number of runaway slaves.150  
 The last of the compromise measures to pass the Senate was the bill on the abolition 
of the slave trade in Washington D.C. The Senate voted on September 16, 1850, and passed it 
by a vote of 33 to 19. The abolition of the slave trade in D.C. marked the end of Congress’ 
long and hard-fought battle to pass the Compromise of 1850 and bring some semblance of 
peace to the United States. Despite Badger’s spirit of compromise, the abolition of the slave 
trade in the District of Columbia was the one measure on which he voted no. Badger’s 
reasoning behind his vote against the bill was that it did not include an amendment that 
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protected the slaveholders in D.C., and after Seward’s attempt to abolish slavery there 
entirely, Badger felt that protections of D.C. slaveholders were desperately needed.151  
 The people of North Carolina were also very opinionated on the compromise 
measures suggested by Henry Clay, with many North Carolinians opposing them. The 
Fayetteville Weekly Observer noted, “It will be seen that not a voice was raised, except Mr. 
Clay’s, in advocacy of his scheme…and yet…the papers say it will undoubtedly pass. Of 
course, if it should, it will be of no value.”152 Despite the newspaper editors’ negativity 
towards Clay’s initial bill, they were hopeful that it would lead to something better: “we 
hope, however, that it will prove the foundation on which the wisdom of the Senate will eject 
an acceptable compromise.”153  
The disapproval of Clay’s compromise measures came from the perceived notion that 
northerners were receiving the lion’s share of the benefits from the compromise. The North 
received the admission of California as a free state, the reduction of Texas’ borders, the 
abolition of the slave trade in Washington D.C., and the organization of the Utah and New 
Mexico territories with the allowance of slavery being decided by popular sovereignty. This 
last benefit was one that seemed unfair to the South, as most people at the time felt that the 
climates of Utah and New Mexico were inhospitable to slavery, making them de facto free 
states if slavery was not explicitly allowed there. In turn, for all these concessions, the South 
received a stricter Fugitive Slave Act, which northerners could still find ways to avoid 
following. Many of the people of North Carolina were unhappy with Clay’s compromise 
measures and hoped that a better deal could be struck. 
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 Those in Congress who passed the bills that became the Compromise of 1850 wanted 
it to be the final settlement on the question of slavery in the United States, and some of them 
may have even believed that they had achieved peace in their time. Badger undoubtedly 
belonged to this school of thought, as he believed the compromise measures were the best 
solution Congress could come up with at the time and should be treated as the final say on 
the issue of slavery.154 However, the debates over slavery were only getting started, as the 
coming decade proved to be the final one of the original Republic’s life. A decade that began 
with the country unifying behind compromise, the 1850s ended with violence and bloodshed, 
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Chapter Three: Catalyst, 1850-1860 
The rain came showering down as a “Great Mass Meeting of Union Men” gathered in 
Salisbury, North Carolina on Thursday, October 11, and Friday, October 12, 1860. This 
meeting was a stop on the campaign trail for the Constitutional Union’s presidential 
candidate, John Bell of Tennessee, and several other Whig politicians up for election in 
North Carolina. The meeting began at midday Thursday with the ringing of bells. The 
highlight came from Zebulon Vance, who braved the monsoon-like conditions to deliver an 
“argumentative and witty” speech. Vance’s ability as a speaker did not go unnoticed, with the 
correspondent for the Whig Fayetteville Observer declaring, “he is the best stump orator in 
North Carolina.” The speeches began to wind down following Vance, but the crowd 
remained energized as they eagerly awaited the star speaker of the meeting’s oration the next 
day.156 
The proceedings resumed promptly at eight o’clock on Friday morning, with several 
speakers warming the audience up with their deliveries. Then, much to the crowd’s 
excitement, George E. Badger took the stage to speak on behalf of John Bell. Upon Badger’s 
entrance, he was met with a standing ovation and a call for “three cheers” in his honor. After 
accepting the admiration of his fellow North Carolinians, Badger delivered a ninety-minute 
speech that both entertained and informed the crowd about Bell. The Fayetteville Observer 
noted, “Mr. Badger made a speech of great ability, not only full of argument but also of a 
popular style…[it was] eloquent, thrilling, and impressed all.” Though, how Badger spoke 
was quite memorable, what he said proved to be extremely poignant: “John Bell, with a 
statesmanlike sagacity and foresight which I did not possess voted against the Kansas-
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Nebraska bill, I voted for it. John Bell did right, and I gave the worst vote of my life.” Badger 
made this claim before the most serious consequence of the Kansas-Nebraska Act was felt 
and spent the remainder of his active political years trying to mend the fissure created by the 
most regretted decision of his career as a senator.157 
*** 
The National Whig Party underwent a metamorphosis in the 1850s. In North 
Carolina, the first step towards the death of the state-level Whig Party came in 1848 when 
David S. Reid, Democratic candidate for governor, ran on the platform of “free suffrage.”158 
Free suffrage referred to the right for any white North Carolinian male to vote for state 
senators regardless of how much land they owned. Historian Thomas Jeffrey noted that Whig 
Party members opposed free suffrage in 1848 because they feared it would lead to more 
radical state constitutional changes that would cause conflict between the eastern and western 
sections of the state.159 Whigs feared that a large number of smaller landowners would vote 
for the Democratic Party since, unlike in many other southern states, North Carolina’s largest 
slaveowners favored the Whig Party. Whigs acknowledged the need to adopt the policy of 
free suffrage in 1850, but by then the Democrats had already siphoned off enough of the 
Whig Party’s support in western North Carolina to gain a majority of votes.160 Following the 
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decline of the North Carolina Whig Party, the national Whig Party suffered one of its most 
devastating blows. 
Though the Compromise of 1850 attempted to eliminate slavery as a political issue, 
the presidential election of 1852 became centered on slavery and the Compromise of 1850 
itself. The Compromise’s importance to the election of 1852 became clear early on, with a 
publicly declared commitment to the Compromise influencing who each faction of the Whig 
Party nominated. The disagreement between northern anti-slavery Whigs, who were more 
powerful and vastly outnumbered their Democratic counterparts, and their southern brethren 
over who to nominate as their presidential candidate cut the national Whig Party deeply, as 
northern Whigs opposed the Compromise while southern Whigs favored it. This 
disagreement revealed the presence of a terminal illness that eventually led to the national 
Whig Party’s death in just a few short years.161 
The northern faction of the Whig Party nominated General Winfield Scott as their 
presidential candidate, partially because he was a successful military general during the 
Mexican American War, like the last victorious Whig presidential candidate Zachary Taylor. 
Northern anti-slavery Whigs also favored Scott because he had not publicly committed 
himself to the Compromise of 1850 and its Fugitive Slave Act that was hated in the North. 
Scott’s nomination caused southern Whigs to feel nervous, leading them to choose their own 
nominee, Millard Fillmore. Fillmore’s nomination was based entirely on his commitment to 
the Compromise of 1850, and his incumbent status as President helped his odds. However, 
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southern Whigs made it clear that they would support anyone as the national party’s 
candidate if he publicly committed to the Compromise of 1850.162 
In the end, Scott became the Whig presidential candidate and gave private assurances 
to those concerned by his nomination that he would accept the party’s platform which 
endorsed the Compromise of 1850.163 Badger, though unhappy with the outcome, supported 
his party staunchly, stating, “in all frankness…no man in the United States was more 
disappointed…than I was when [Fillmore] was passed over…[though I support] the Whig 
national nomination for the Presidency.”164 The people of North Carolina agreed with 
Badger’s disappointment. The Whig Wilmington Daily Journal stated, “To say that Gen. 
Scott’s nomination has been received here with coldness, nay, with anger and disgust, would 
be to state but the simple truth.”165 The newspaper continued, “it is evident that the Northern 
Whigs…forced Scott upon the Party [despite] opposition [from] the united South,” and that 
the paper knew “that there are many intelligent and reflecting Whigs who [will not]…vote 
for Gen. Scott.”166 
The election of 1852 proved to be both unenthusiastic and extremely close in North 
Carolina, with both parties failing to turn out their voters en masse. Franklin Pierce, a 
northern Democrat from New Hampshire, won by less than one percentage point, the first 
Democrat to do so since 1836.167 Commenting on Pierce’s win, one North Carolina Whig 
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newspaper, the Fayetteville Semi-Weekly Observer, stated, “we are grievously disappointed 
at the general result. It is as much contrary to our expectations as to our hopes.”168 The 
newspaper predicted, “we expect little of good from the Party or its administration,” though it 
hoped that the President would do well, stating, “we are all in the same boat, and must sink 
or swim together.”169 
The national Whig Party never recovered from the divide caused by the election of 
1852, and Winfield Scott proved to be the last presidential nominee put forth by the party. 
Franklin Pierce’s election was more influential to the history of the United States than the 
lack of enthusiasm surrounding it foreshadowed. Pierce played a key role during the 
enforcement of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, making the pivotal decision to support the 
fraudulent pro-slavery government in Kansas. Due to his actions, Pierce made the violence in 
Kansas worse and undoubtedly moved the country closer to the Civil War.170 
 For the North Carolina Whig Party, their defeat in the 1850 state elections could be 
considered their first sign that the 1850s were going to be a tumultuous decade, and for the 
national Whig Party, the same could be said about the presidential election of 1852. Though 
perhaps for George Badger, two other events proved to be strong personal harbingers of bad 
things to come. The first of these was Badger’s tumultuous reelection. The second was the 
Senate’s rejection of his appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States by one vote 
in 1853.171  
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Following Justice John McKinley’s death in July 1852, President Fillmore needed to 
nominate someone to fill the vacant seat. Fillmore’s first choice was Kentucky legislator 
John J. Crittenden, but Crittenden declined, suggesting that Fillmore nominate Badger 
instead. After some persuasion, Badger agreed to be nominated under the condition that his 
confirmation would be certain.172 Fillmore sent Badger’s nomination to the Senate for 
confirmation in early January 1853, with there being “no personal objection to Badger 
[amongst Democratic Senators] other than the fact that he belonged to the Whig party.”173 
The Washington D.C. Democratic newspaper, the Daily Union reflected the views of Senate 
Democrats, declaring negatively that “as a politician, Mr. Badger is distinguished for his 
extreme Federal notions,” as well as his arguments for “the powers of the general 
government.”174 Democratic papers from North Carolina were also wary of Badger’s 
nomination. The Wilmington Journal asserted that North Carolinians were “State Rights men 
and that the present ascendency of the Democratic party in the State is due mainly to…State 
Rights.”175  
These sentiments played a large role in Badger’s nomination to the Supreme Court 
coming to an end when the Senate voted 26 to 25 to postpone his nomination indefinitely.176 
Becoming a Supreme Court Justice would have been a great opportunity for Badger. As 
biographer Lawrence London noted, Badger’s failed nomination caused him to be “greatly 
disappointed since it was the type of work which he would have enjoyed and for which he 
was eminently qualified.”177 Despite his personal disappointment, Badger’s fellow 
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congressmen were ecstatic to keep him in the Senate. John Kerr, a Whig Congressman from 
North Carolina, proclaimed, “[Badger] is doing the state great honor here, and has acquired a 
national reputation such as no other man from our state ever has won here in Congress.”178 
Badger’s hard-fought and ultimately victorious re-election along with his failed 
nomination to the Supreme Court, proved serendipitous for him, as it allowed him to take 
part in the thirty-third Congress, perhaps one of the most significant Congresses in the 
history of the United States, responsible for passing one of the most impactful pieces of 
legislation in United States history, the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The bloodshed that followed 
the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act was undoubtedly fueled by some of the discussions 
and arguments in Congress during the debate over the bill. 
*** 
 Following a decade of land expansion, the dispute over slavery’s extension arose 
regarding lands where the future of slavery had been decided decades earlier—the northern 
Louisiana territory. The Missouri Compromise had “forever prohibited” the expansion of 
slavery into that area, but a cascading series of events caused southerners to covet the 
northern Louisiana territory for themselves. The first of these events was the admittance of 
Arkansas as a slave state in 1836. An event that at the time was undoubtedly a cause for 
celebration amongst southerners but ended up being the only bright spot for those in favor of 
slavery’s expansion; since by 1852, Arkansas was the only slave state to be carved from the 
Louisiana Purchase since the Missouri Compromise of 1820. The second event that 
disheartened southerners about spreading slavery any further into the Louisiana Purchase 
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territory was Andrew Jackson’s “Indian Removal Policy,” which made the rest of the 
Louisiana territory south of the Missouri Compromise line Native American territory.179 
 With no other viable areas for slavery to expand into, southerners turned their 
attention to the area of the Louisiana territory west of the Show-Me State. Missouri 
Democratic Senator David R. Atchison, a member of the infamous “F Street Mess,” an 
influential group of southern congressmen named after the mess-hall that they stayed at while 
in Washington D.C., was a large proponent for the expansion of slavery west of Missouri.180 
Atchison’s desire was heavily based in politics. His constituents wanted to prevent a potential 
free state existing directly west of Missouri into which fugitive slaves could escape. The 
largest roadblock standing in the way of slavery’s expansion west of Missouri, the Missouri 
Compromise’s ban on slavery north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, had to be repealed 
before Atchison and those like him could be appeased.181  
 Another, and quite possibly the largest, influencer of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois solidified his position as Congress’ “little magician” with 
his maneuvering during the debate over the bill. Driven by greed, Douglas wanted a 
transcontinental railroad to run from Chicago through the Nebraska territory to raise the price 
of land he owned in the Windy City. Historian Michael Holt notes that it is ironic how the 
most ardent supporters of organizing the area west of Missouri were “Northern sources,” and 
not southern slave owners. Virtually all of these “Northern sources” were Democrats, 
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because they saw the issue of organizing the territory that would eventually become Kansas 
and Nebraska as a tool to unite the northern and southern sections of their party. Southern 
Democrats had turned against the Missouri Compromise after becoming hardened in their 
views against congressional prohibition of slavery due to their long fight against the Wilmot 
Proviso.182 
 The Democrats were aided in their efforts of expanding slavery west of Missouri by 
the decaying nature of the Whig Party. Whig congressmen from the South had become an 
endangered species by 1852, making Badger one of the last of his kind. The northern Whig 
Party was also in trouble, due to emerging challengers fighting for their voters. The 
Democrats capitalized on their opponent’s weakness, and on January 4, 1854, Douglas 
introduced a bill to Congress organizing the Nebraska territory, with popular sovereignty 
deciding the fate of slavery there.183 
 Holt argued that Douglas put forth this bill with “the good of the Democratic party, 
[and] not of the nation [being] Douglas’ top priority” and that during the debate surrounding 
the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, “politicians made decisions from short-term 
calculations of partisan, factional, or personal advantage rather than from any long-term 
concern for the health…of the Union.”184 Though some of the reasoning behind the Kansas-
Nebraska Act was selfish, Holt’s statement was made by someone viewing the decisions of 
politicians through the lens of the consequences those decisions had, something that the 
politicians at the time could not have done, as they did not intend for, or know that their 
decisions would lead to the Civil War. Also, this statement oversimplifies and generalizes the 
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issue at hand, as several northern and southern politicians voted for the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
because it was the best measure Congress could come up with at the time to hold the Union 
together. 
 Douglas’ initial bill pleased no one, with northern Whigs claiming that it went too far 
towards repealing the Missouri Compromise line, and southern Democrats claiming that it 
needed to repeal the line outright. Douglas went back to work and introduced his revised bill 
to Congress on January 23, 1854. Douglas’ revised bill contained two critical changes; the 
first being the organization of two territories – Kansas and Nebraska – instead of one, and the 
second being a section stating that the Missouri Compromise line was “inoperative and void” 
because it was inconsistent with the “compromise measures”  of 1850.185 A little over half-
way through the Senate’s debate over Douglas’ bill, Badger arose and delivered a speech 
called “On the Nebraska Bill,” in which he detailed what he believed to be the true question 
being debated. 
 Badger opened his speech by declaring, “Everyone must be aware that the real 
question…involved in the consideration of the bill… [is] the power of legislation over the 
subject of slavery.”186 As Badger stated in his speeches during the debate over the 
Compromise of 1850, he thought that the Constitution gave Congress the power to determine 
where slavery could and could not exist, but he thought that Congress should not use that 
power.187 Badger spent most of his “Nebraska” speech examining the differences between 
the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise of 1850 and determining which one should 
be applied to the territories proposed in the Kansas-Nebraska Act. He boiled the debate 
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surrounding the Kansas-Nebraska Act down to a discussion over slavery’s expansion via 
popular sovereignty or a congressional line, making a vote for the Kansas-Nebraska Act one 
for or against the concept of popular sovereignty.  
 Badger went back and forth between what he thought agreed with precedent and what 
he thought was right. Badger started his “Nebraska” speech by discussing what the Missouri 
Compromise meant, and why repealing it would cause problems: “it is said that [the Kansas-
Nebraska Act] is a repeal of the Missouri Compromise…if that were so, I, for one, say, 
without hesitation, that nothing can be a compensation to [the South] for the violation of the 
principles of good faith.”188 Badger went on to state, “now, I say that it is plain that [the 
Missouri Compromise] was intended to apply to all organizations of government, State and 
Territories.”189 He thought “when the Missouri Compromise line was established, it was 
intended to apply to all territory of the United States”190 even those territories acquired later, 
implying that the framers of the Missouri Compromise intended it to last forever. 
 Following his discussion on the intentions behind the Missouri Compromise, Badger 
shared some of his personal feelings about the legislation. Badger started by stating that the 
admittance of Missouri was “one of the most remarkable pieces of humbuggery that ever was 
palmed off on any legislative body.”191 He then went on to announce that “I have pointed out 
the folly, the absolute nonsense [behind the passage of the Missouri Compromise], but I 
suppose it was the best that could be done.”192 Despite his vitriol towards the passage of the 
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Missouri Compromise, Badger noted that, before the passage of the Compromise of 1850, he 
argued that the Missouri Compromise line should be carried to the Pacific Ocean. He also 
stated that he “was anxious to adhere to the Missouri Compromise line” during the debate 
over the Compromise of 1850,” because “it gave a clear legal ground to stand upon,” and that 
it had “a large share of favor in the public mind, which could not be secured by any new 
line.”193 Despite this “clear legal ground,” Badger stated that the “principle upon which the 
legislation of 1820 was based, was repudiated by the legislation of 1850.”194 
 Badger concluded his “Nebraska” speech by asserting that the Compromise of 1850 
overrode the Missouri Compromise because the Compromise of 1850 “was founded upon a 
distinct repudiation of the idea of making any difference between the condition of a people 
lying on one side of a line…and the condition of a people lying on the other.”195 Badger 
bluntly summarized this by stating “in 1850, what had been thus recognized [the Missouri 
Compromise line] was distinctly and unequivocally repudiated.”196 After determining that the 
principles of the Missouri Compromise were destroyed, Badger stated, “my own individual 
opinion upon the subject [is] that the principles adopted in 1850 are the true principles.”197 
Badger noted that he felt this way because the Compromise of 1850 allowed citizens to self-
determine whether they lived in a slave or free State.198 
 On March 4, 1854, a little over two weeks after Badger’s speech, the Senate moved to 
vote on the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The bill passed by a vote of thirty-seven to fourteen, with 
Whig Senator John Bell of Tennessee being the only southerner to vote against it. After 
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debating it for a few weeks, the House of Representatives passed the bill as well, by a much 
narrower vote of 113 to 100. On May 30, 1854, President Franklin Pierce signed the Kansas-
Nebraska Act into law, ending one of the most contentious periods in congressional history, 
but opening the door for an era of violence, revolt, and Civil War.199 
 Despite the future consequences of the Kansas-Nebraska Act being dire, the initial 
reaction to the legislation in North Carolina was positive. Upon the passage of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, the Democratic Weekly Raleigh Standard reported, “we very decidedly 
approve of the Nebraska and Kansas bill…a measure which breathes the true spirit of the 
Constitution…[and strikes] from the statute book of the United States the stigma cast upon 
the South in 1820 by the Missouri restriction.”200 Southern Whigs agreed with most of this 
statement, putting their views more in line with their fellow southerners rather than their 
fellow Whigs. The Whig Daily Journal proclaimed, “in glancing over the vote of the Senate 
on the bill…we are forcibly impressed by the contrast in the nationality of the Democratic 
and Whig parties,”201 showing that they seemed to appreciate the Democratic parties ability 
to unite its northern and southern wings. Lastly, to express a sentiment that was shared by 
almost all Americans, the seemingly apolitical Biblical Recorder from Raleigh stated, “we 
hope the settlement of this question by Congress will give permanent quiet to the Country in 
regard to the subject of slavery.”202 
 Congress decided to rest on their laurels, after passing legislation to put an end to the 
slavery question four years after they passed legislation to put an end to the slavery question. 
Meanwhile, Kansas began to unravel. After Congress’ term ended for the year, Badger stood 
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for re-election, with the North Carolina legislature meeting in November 1854 to vote on 
who would fill Badger’s Senate seat when it expired on March 4, 1855. The Whig Party 
nominated Badger for re-election, and though his vote in favor of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
had gained him some support from the Democrats, his, or any Whig candidate’s, chances of 
winning were non-existent, as Democrats had secured a majority in both houses of the North 
Carolina legislature. The Democratic Party nominated Asa Biggs, a prominent lawyer from 
North Carolina’s coast, to challenge Badger. Biggs defeated Badger on the first ballot in the 
House, by a vote of sixty-four to fifty-two, and then was confirmed in the Senate twenty-
seven to seventeen.203 Commenting on the Democrats’ victory, the Raleigh Register noted 
that North Carolina Whigs would have to “shut [their] eyes and take the dose.”204 
 News of Badger’s defeat spread quickly, and people on both sides of the aisle 
lamented his loss. The Whig Philadelphia News stated, “truly may it be said that the old 
North State has fallen…when such lofty intellects as… Badger are set aside…for pigmies 
like Biggs.”205 Stephen Adams, a Democratic Senator from Mississippi, noted in the Senate 
the day before Badger was to depart “an expression of the high appreciation of Senators and 
the Senate is tendered to the Honorable George E. Badger…for his uniform courtesy, ability, 
liberality, and valuable services…we deeply regret the severance of [our] official and 
personal ties.”206 Despite leaving the Senate following the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Badger’s 
role as North Carolina’s leading voice of reason had not come to an end.  
 As violence began to erupt across the United States, from the Kansas frontier to the 
chambers of Congress, conflict between the free North and the slave South appeared 
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inevitable. The first burst of brutality came during the creation of the Kansas territorial 
government and ultimately morphed into what can arguably be described as the first true 
battles of the Civil War. The turmoil in Kansas started the moment that land in the territory 
was put up for purchase, with most of the initial buyers being small farmers from the 
Midwest, and non-slaveholders from the Upper South. This majority group of settlers came 
to Kansas for the cheap land and promise of opportunity, and their main goal was to keep all 
African Americans, free or slave, out of the territory.207 
 Things quickly changed once slave-owners from neighboring Missouri, and other 
southern states began to move into Kansas with the sole purpose of transforming the territory 
into a slave state. These slaveowners were met with resistance from New Englanders who 
moved to Kansas to ensure that the territory became a free state. The situation eventually got 
out of hand when former Senator David Atchison called on armed Missourians to pour into 
Kansas on the territorial government election day to gain the legislative majority for the slave 
power in Kansas. Known as “Border Ruffians,” their interference in the election led to 
hundreds of fraudulent ballots being cast, creating a pro-slavery government in Kansas that 
passed some of the strictest pro-slavery laws in the country.208 
 Following the establishment of the fraudulent pro-slavery government in Topeka, 
Kansas, all the anti-slavery northerners that were elected resigned in protest and set up a free 
soil government in the town of Lawrence. President Franklin Pierce denounced the Lawrence 
government as an “outlaw regime,”209 causing tensions between the two factions to rise 
immensely. Clashes between the free soil government in Lawrence and the fraudulent pro-
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slavery government in Topeka led to a small war in Kansas over the future of slavery 
there.210 
 Outraged by the violence in Kansas, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner stood 
before the Senate on May 19 and 20, 1856, to deliver his now famous speech, “The Crime 
Against Kansas.” Sumner used part of his oratory to attack South Carolina Senator Andrew 
Pickens Butler, who was absent from the chamber. Sumner stated that Butler “has read many 
books of chivalry, and believes himself a chivalrous knight of course, he has chosen a 
mistress to whom he has made his vows, and who, though ugly to others, is always lovely to 
him, I mean, the harlot, slavery.”211 Sumner went on to mock Butler, a recent stroke victim, 
for his inability to speak well, and also imply that the South was “an Empire of 
Mongralization and Rape.”212 However, the worst offense that Sumner made against the 
South, and by association Butler and his kinsmen, was, as historian Michael P. Pierson has 
pointed out, the insinuation that southerners valued the sex that they could coerce from their 
slaves more than the labor.213 
 Insulted by Sumner’s remarks about his cousin, Butler, and his homeland, South 
Carolina Representative Preston Brooks approached Sumner in the Senate chambers while 
Sumner sat at his desk. Initially, Brooks only meant to lightly chastise Sumner, but Brooks 
quickly lost control and began striking Sumner with his cane, bludgeoning him over thirty 
times until Sumner lay unconscious in a pool of blood on the Senate floor.214 Reporting on 
the incident, one North Carolina newspaper, the Fayetteville Weekly Observer, noted, “the 
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Honorable Preston S. Brooks having shattered his handsome…cane over the noodle of 
Charles Sumner…is now in need of another,” and that “to show their appreciation of his late 
‘licking’ of Senator Sumner,” some men were going to provide Brooks a new cane with a 
“gold head.”215 
 In the days between Sumner’s speech and Brooks’ vicious assault, the most brutal 
event of the war in Kansas occurred, the Pottawatomie Massacre. Led by John Brown, an 
anti-slavery zealot who declared “something must be done to show these barbarians that we, 
too, have rights,”216 following the caning of Sumner and an attack on Lawrence, the 
Pottawatomie Massacre occurred on the night of May 24-25, 1856. Under the cover of 
darkness, Brown, four of his sons, and three other men pulled five pro-slavery settlers near 
Pottawatomie Creek out of their houses and butchered them with broadswords, to “fight fire 
with fire.”217 Brown and his accomplices were able to avoid punishment for their crimes, 
until their ill-fated attempt to raid a federal armory in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in October 
1859.218 
 Brown and a group of his supporters captured the federal armory in Harpers Ferry on 
the night of October 16, 1859, in hopes of initiating a slave revolt. The plan failed. The 
United States Army, under the leadership of Robert E. Lee and J.E.B. Stuart, was called in, 
and as quick as it began, John Brown's raid came to an end. Brown was quickly tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to hang. Following his execution on December 2, 1859, Brown 
became a martyr in the North for the anti-slavery cause. The Kansas-Nebraska Act initiated 
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all of the death, violence, and conflict that occurred in and because of Kansas, giving 
credence to Badger’s assertion that voting for that bill was the worst decision of his political 
career.219 
 Amidst all the chaos in Kansas, the United States held its eighteenth presidential 
election–the first without a Whig candidate in twenty years, and the first with a Republican 
nominee. Despite the National Whig Party’s death being finalized by 1856, the election gave 
the party the chance to show that it was still competitive in North Carolina. One of the 
reasons for the party’s continued, albeit waning, success in 1856 was North Carolina voters’ 
rebuff of the Know-Nothing Party’s advances. North Carolina’s population was almost 
entirely white Anglo-Saxon protestants, so the Nativism and anti-Catholic sentiment that 
drew most people to the Know-Nothing, or American, Party did not entice North Carolina 
voters as much.220 
 The Know-Nothing Party’s strategy to win elections in North Carolina also worked to 
their disadvantage. Know-Nothings tried to run former Democrats in Democratic counties 
and former Whigs in Whig counties, giving the party no semblance of unity or cohesion. 
Then, during the election of 1856, the Know-Nothings were perplexed as to why so many 
North Carolinians still identified as Whigs, leading the Know-Nothing Party to appeal to 
Whigs, and costing them much needed Democratic support. In the end, however, nothing the 
Know-Nothings could have done would have been enough to win the South, not when a 
Republican was running for president. Most Whigs in North Carolina decided to vote for the 
Democratic candidate James Buchanan because they saw him as the most viable option to 
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beat the Republican John C. Fremont. This hopping of party lines upset Badger, a firm Whig 
who had never considered joining the Know-Nothing Party, “our election here yesterday has 
resulted in a most disastrous defeat for us and an amazing triumph for democracy. Our old-
line Whigs behaved like apes – having turned Democratic, have ruined the State. Heaven 
help us!”221 
 By the time the dust had settled in North Carolina following the election of 1856, the 
Know-Nothing Party was lifeless. Policy differences between the Democratic and Whig 
parties, both at the federal and state level, allowed the North Carolina Whig Party to become 
revitalized in 1858 and 1859. The Panic of 1857, along with the Democrat’s poor economic 
strategy and perceived wastefulness, allowed Whigs to attack the extravagance and 
corruption that they stated was plaguing the Democratic Party. At the state level, many North 
Carolinians were becoming irritated by the fact that slaveowners did not pay their fair share 
of taxes on the slaves they owned, or, as it was called, an ad valorem tax. Whigs saw this and 
decided to transform the debate into a partisan issue to gain votes in the coming elections. 
The debate over ad valorem taxation caused political enthusiasm to soar in North Carolina, 
with Whigs arguing that taxing slaveowners more would strengthen slavery by giving non-
slaveowners more of a reason to defend the institution. Democrats, on the other hand, 
appeared to oppose the concept because it would increase taxes on some of their voters, but 
mostly because it was supported by the Whigs.222 
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 The Whig Party’s newfound line of attack on the Democrats proved successful, with 
Whig Representative candidate Zebulon Vance winning a special election in 1859. Vance’s 
victory helped the North Carolina congressional delegation of 1859 to be half Whig. Badger 
was enthused by rising Whig prospects, writing to Kentucky Senator John Crittenden, 
“everything is going on here beautifully – equal taxation is overruling everything, and 
everybody opposed to it. We have a cheering prospect of electing a Whig Governor, though 
Ellis,” a Democrat who won the governorship in the previous election “was elected…by a 
majority of 16,000.”223 Badger’s hopes were almost realized when the Whig gubernatorial 
candidate John Pool received 47.2 percent of the vote. Despite Pool’s loss, the Whig Party 
was able to cut the Democratic majority in the North Carolina legislature from fifty-eight to 
sixteen, proving that things were looking promising for the party’s future.224 
 The escalation of violence in Kansas, John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, and the 
nomination of Abraham Lincoln as the Republican Party’s presidential candidate proved to 
be the water that extinguished Whigs’ newly re-lit fuse. The presidential election of 1860 can 
best be described, non-vulgarly, as a traffic jam, with four major candidates competing for 
the presidency, two of which were from the same party. The candidates for president were 
the Republican Abraham Lincoln, the Constitutional Unionist John Bell, the northern 
Democrat Stephen Douglas, and the southern Democrat John Breckenridge, though Lincoln 
did not appear on ballots throughout much of the South.225 
 The election was relatively simple in North Carolina, with Bell and Breckinridge 
competing for the victory, though Douglas did steal a small number of votes from each 
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candidate. The Constitutional Union’s key argument was that southern Democrats only 
brought up the topic of slavery in the territories to weaken the Union, thus claiming that civil 
war was the southern Democrats' main goal. The southern Democrats on the other hand 
argued that their candidate was the best option to beat Lincoln and the Republicans, basically 
re-hashing the Democratic strategy of 1856. In the end, Breckenridge carried North Carolina 
with 50.4 percent of the vote, along with the rest of the Lower South. Bell won all the Upper 
South, except for Missouri which was the only state won by Stephen Douglas. Despite the 
outrage towards Lincoln’s candidacy in the South, his vast support in the North gave him a 
comfortable win in the electoral college.226 
 Upon learning of Lincoln’s election, the Whig Wilmington Daily Herald stated, “it 
seems to be certain that Lincoln is elected President… South Carolina will no doubt 
[secede]…but we feel assured that the Old North State will stand firm [and]…act for herself, 
and not for the ‘Cotton States.’”227 This sentiment was shared by most North Carolinians, 
including Badger, who stated while he was in the Senate: “I believe…nay, I have no doubt 
that the people of North Carolina will refuse, for any such cause, to embark in any 
proceedings which, either directly or indirectly look or lend to a dissolution of the Union.”228 
Badger also previously noted, “I hold myself as having no right to go out of the Union – no 
right to destroy it – and I have no wish if I had that right to do so.”229 Though Badger, like 
his home state, eventually “cast his lot with the Confederacy,” he did so begrudgingly, and 
only because he thought it was the last way to save the Union.230 
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 The nation was thrown into chaos following the election of Abraham Lincoln by a 
strictly sectional vote. North Carolina inevitably held a vote for a secession convention on 
February 28, 1861, despite what Badger and many of his fellow North Carolinians thought 
about the matter. The Tarheel state’s vote for a secession convention proved disappointing 
for those fire-eaters in the state who wanted North Carolina to secede quickly and join the 
rest of the “early seceders.”231 Union sentiment won the day, and North Carolinians voted not 
to hold a convention. Badger, who had been elected alongside two Union Democrats to 
represent Wake County in the event there was a convention stated, “it was the strength of 
Union feeling that did it.”232 
 The strength of Union sentiment in North Carolina should not have been a surprise to 
contemporaries. The North Carolina House of Representatives voted on January 29, 1861, to 
send militia to help protect D.C., and many Democrats in the state were against secession in 
February 1861.233 The Democratic newspaper The Weekly Standard out of Raleigh published 
a letter from a “Democratic Friend” that stated:  
I will never agree to give up my claims on the federal government until that 
government is changed and turned against me…the seceders have acted rashly 
and badly. They have not acted wisely or loyally for themselves or their 
peoples’ sakes…I am disposed never to support for office any man that I 
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know to be an unguarded secessionist; and in case of a convention we intend 
to support strictly Union men.234 
 
 Noticing Badger’s strong support of the Union, leading members of Congress urged 
Lincoln to choose either Badger or John Adams Gilmer to be a member of the President’s 
cabinet from North Carolina. Historian Daniel Crofts noted, “though Badger was better 
known nationally and more experienced…Gilmer’s greatest advantage over Badger…was his 
current active political involvement.”235 Lincoln chose to ignore the advice of Congress and 
decided to select neither Badger nor Gilmer to be in his cabinet. However, the President’s 
administration did consult with Badger, and other notable Upper South Unionists, about who 
Lincoln should appoint to federal positions in the Upper South.236 Though the questions 
remain, why did North Carolinians refuse to secede in February 1861, and why did they 
change their mind just three months later? 
 Examining the data on the number of slaves to whites and slave owners to non-slave 
owners in North Carolina could make one think that the state would join the “early seceders,” 
as North Carolina had more slaves to whites and the same ratio of slave owners to non-
slaveowners as Texas, a state that seceded before Lincoln’s inauguration.237 Also, slave 
owners made up eighty-one percent of North Carolina’s state legislature, the largest 
percentage of any state, showing that slave owners controlled Tarheel politics. Despite this, 
North Carolina became the last state to secede from the Union. Whig politics are what keep 
the state in the Union until the bitter end.238 
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 North Carolina, and the rest of the Upper South to a lesser extent, continued to have a 
functioning two-party system following the collapse of the National Whig Party. North 
Carolinians’ loyalty to the Whig Party proved to be the cause of this. The best example of the 
Whig Party’s continued support in North Carolina is the presidential election of 1856 when 
Millard Fillmore ran as a Know-Nothing in every state except for North Carolina, where he 
was on the ballot as a Whig.239 
 The continued two-party system held North Carolina in the Union because it provided 
a defense against the fire-eaters and immediate secessionists in the state. Without a sizeable 
second party determined to oppose the secessionist Democrats, North Carolina would have 
seceded in February 1861, since the union Democrats would not have had any substantial 
number of anti-secession allies to join. The intense magnetic pull of party loyalty that voters 
felt cannot be overlooked, as those who favored the Whig Party sometimes opposed 
secession in February 1861 simply because most Democrats favored it. However, as the 
secession crisis continued and Confederates fired the first shots of the American Civil War at 
Fort Sumter, many North Carolinians found that they could not side with the Union in a war 
against the South.240 
 The initial northern plan to avoid war was newspaper editor Horace Greeley’s “go-in-
peace” plan, where he advised Lincoln that the South “simply mean[t] to bully the Free 
States into concessions.”241 Greeley viewed secession like a toddler’s tantrum, best dealt with 
by ignoring it and letting it work itself out. Greely thought that if the seceded states were left 
alone, unionists – that he assumed were a silent majority in those states – could regain 
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control and end the secession crisis. Unionists watched as secession sentiment continued to 
grow in the South and a compromise committee in the Senate sought to appease the South 
into staying in the Union.242  
 Created by the Senate and comprised of some of the most powerful politicians of 
unionist and secessionist persuasion, the “Committee of Thirteen”  met over the secession 
winter of 1860-61 to try and uphold the United States’ age-old tradition of putting its 
problems on the back burner for later generations to solve. Senator John J. Crittenden from 
Kentucky, a member of the committee, proposed a series of amendments to the Constitution 
that would have protected slavery from the federal government. These amendments 
reinstated the Missouri Compromise line and extended it to all territories “now held, or 
hereafter acquired,” forbade Congress from abolishing slavery on federal property within 
slave states, forbade Congress from abolishing slavery in Washington D.C. unless it had 
already been abolished in Virginia and Maryland and the citizens of D.C. voted for its 
abolition, stopped Congress from interfering with the interstate slave trade, and compensated 
slave owners who were prevented from capturing their fugitive slaves. Crittenden crafted 
these amendments with language that prevented them from being amended or overridden in 
the future.243 
 Crittenden’s compromise proved nothing more than appeasement, though, 
nevertheless, many Republicans, including Lincoln’s Secretary of State William H. Seward, 
supported it. Their support quickly came to an end when Lincoln ordered that Republicans 
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“entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to the extension of slavery…The tug 
has to come, and better now that any time hereafter…If we surrender, it is the end of us…A 
year will not pass till we shall have to take Cuba as a condition upon which [the South] will 
stay in the Union.”244 Lincoln’s words swayed every Republican on the “Committee of 
Thirteen” to vote against Crittenden’s compromise, defeating it by a vote of seven to six. 
Despite this defeat, Crittenden put his compromise up to a vote before the Senate, who 
rejected it twenty-five to twenty-three, with all twenty-five nay votes coming from 
Republicans.245 
While discussing the Crittenden compromise measures, the Charleston Mercury 
declared, “Mr. Crittenden is full of lamentations on the fall of the Union…there is not a man 
alive – not Seward, nor Lincoln, nor Greely – who has done more to dissolve the Union that 
Crittenden.”246 In response to this attack on Crittenden, the Newbern Weekly Progress stated, 
“the Charleston Mercury seems of late to have transferred its hatred from the Northern 
abolitionists to the statesmen and people of the border slave states.”247 The Charleston 
Mercury continued to attack Crittenden and the Whig Party as a whole, further alienating 
those North Carolinians who held the same views as the Newbern Weekly Progress, stating 
that abolitionism is “the necessary result of the principles of the Whig Party,” and Crittenden 
“has never respected the people of the South.”248 In rebuttal to the Charleston Mercury, the 
Newbern Weekly Progress asserted, “whether Mr. Crittenden’s proposed compromise will be 
accepted by the…Republicans…we do not know, but, if they are, the people of the South will 
 
244 Abraham Lincoln, quoted in McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 253. 
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be satisfied and the Union will be reconstructed.”249 This further illustrates that once the 
“early seceders” had left the Union, there was no compromising with them, but the Upper 
South could still be retained. 
 The House of Representatives also formed their own compromise committee, the 
“Committee of Thirty-Three,” that proposed two recommendations to appease the South. The 
first of these called for “faithful obedience to the fugitive slave law” and passed. The second, 
a proposed Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that guaranteed slavery 
in the states failed, with most Republicans voting against it. The Republican defeat of these 
last-minute acts of appeasement did not cause the Union to dissolve. Senators from seceded 
or soon to be seceded southern states decided not to vote on Crittenden’s compromise when 
their votes would have been enough for it to pass. Also, leaders from southern states were 
already meeting in Montgomery to set up a new Confederate government, ignoring 
compromise efforts in D.C. entirely. These actions show that once Lincoln was elected, no 
amount of compromise or appeasement was going to bring the “early seceders” back into the 
Union.250 
 Before Lincoln’s call for troops following Fort Sumter drove the Upper South states 
of Arkansas, Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina from the Union, several other key 
events occurred that made the Tarheel state’s decision to join the Confederacy an easier one. 
The first of these occurred on February 8, 1861, three weeks before North Carolina’s election 
for a secession convention, when the Confederacy declared that the Old North State had 
more in common with the seceded states than it did with the Union. The Confederate 
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government’s recruitment tactic may have been enough to sway some North Carolinians who 
were on the fence but felt that the Union did not do enough to keep them.  
Secondly, the Union blockade of the South’s coast came after Lincoln’s call for 
troops following Fort Sumter, started on April 19, 1861, and was extended to include 
Virginia and North Carolina on April 27, both states that were still part of the Union. 
Discussing Lincoln’s call for troops, the Raleigh Standard stated, “the proclamation of Mr. 
Lincoln has left no alternative but resistance or unconditional submission. The southern man 
who would quietly submit to the doctrines enunciated in that document is fit only for a 
slave.”251 The Leisure Hour, a newspaper from Oxford, North Carolina, quoted a piece in a 
Virginia newspaper about the blockade, showing that North Carolinians stood in solidarity 
with Virginia in opposition to the extended blockade: “The base wretches at Washington 
have dared to interrupt and destroy [southern] commerce…it is useless to investigate the 
legalist or constitutionality of such a proceeding. The law and the Constitution are wholly 
disregarded by the vulgar ruffians at Washington.”252 The last of these, the Confederate 
government’s admittance of North Carolina into the Confederacy, occurred four days before 
the state seceded.253  
Governor John Ellis called for the North Carolina General Assembly to hold a special 
session in which they called for an election of delegates to meet at a secession convention in 
Raleigh on May 20, 1861. The people of Wake County elected Badger as a delegate to this 
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253 Boykin, North Carolina in 1861, 140-52, 170; “The Union Blockade,” 
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convention much as they did for North Carolina’s first proposed secession convention in 
February. The tone of this one was almost unanimously secessionist. Badger proved that he 
was a strict constitutionalist even while discussing disunion, arguing that revolution was the 
only constitutional means of fighting a tyrannical government and never acknowledged 
secession as a viable option. Under these principles, Badger introduced “An Ordinance 
Declaring the Separation of North Carolina from the United States of America.”254  
In this ordinance, Badger stated that the Republican Party was “hostile in its declared 
principles to the institutions of the Southern States” and that “North Carolina, though greatly 
aggrieved…did nevertheless, abstain from…separation…influenced by an ardent attachment 
to the Union and Constitution.” The purpose of Lincoln’s call for troops, Badger argued, was 
“to wage a civil war against the seceded states…and reduce [their] inhabitants to absolute 
subjection and subject slavery.” “Lincoln, without any shadow of rightful authority, and in 
plain violation of the Constitution…declared all the ports of North Carolina…blockaded.”255 
The convention rejected Badger’s proposal in favor of a secession ordinance introduced by 
Burton Craige. The convention voted unanimously to pass Craige’s proposal, with Badger 
going along because he thought that a united South might deter the North from attacking due 
to the risk of a prolonged and deadly war.256  
The secession of North Carolina proved to be Badger’s last foray into public service, 
as he retired to Raleigh to live out the remaining years of his life. Badger died on May 11, 
1866, in Raleigh, barely one year after the end of the war he fought so hard to avoid and is 
interred in Oakwood Cemetery. Badger left behind a widow, Delia Haywood Badger, and 
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nine children ranging from the ages of twenty to thirty-nine. After Badger’s death the United 
States Navy continued to keep his memory alive by naming three ships after him; ironic since 
his tenure as Secretary of the Navy was the shortest-lived of his career.257  
At the time of his death, Badger was highly respected, with historian Lawrence 
London asserting, “it would undoubtedly be very difficult for one of Badger’s 
contemporaries, were he alive, to understand how the career of one as prominent as Badger 
could have been almost forgotten by the people of North Carolina.”258 Though Badger’s 
name has yet to become a mainstay in the history of North Carolina, his spirit of compromise 
is one that could instruct politicians today. A strict constitutionalist, Badger always voted for 
what he thought best adhered to the founders’ principles, despite some of them going against 
his own personal benefit. Badger’s status as one of the leaders of the North Carolina Whig 
Party, made him integral to the rise of the party in the Tarheel state, as well as its continued 
survival there long after it had died elsewhere. This continued survival is what kept North 
Carolina in the Union for so long, as a thriving second party was able to fend off the majority 
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